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THE PROBLEM OF IDIOGRAPHIC AND NOMOTHETIC SPACE:
 
TOWARDS A METATHEORY OF URBANISM
 
Concepts which have proved useful for ordering things 
easily assume so great an authority over us, that we 
forget their terrestrial origin and accept them as 
unalterable facts. They then become labeled as 
'conceptual necessities', 'apriori solutions', etc. 
The road of scientific progress is frequently blocked 
for long periods by such errors. It is therefore not 
just an idle game to exercise our ability to analyze 
familiar concepts, and to demonstrate the conditions on 
which this justification of their usefulness depends, 
- Albert Einstein 
Hegel makes man the man of self-consciousness instead 
of making self-consciousness the self-consciousness of 
man of real man, man living in a real objective world 
and determined by that world. He stands the world on 
its head and can therefore dissolve in the head all the 
limitations which naturally remain In existence for 
evil sensuousness, for real man. 
- Marx and Engels (7965, p. 254) 
The fate of community...might well be decided by 
specific historical circumstances rather than the 
inexorable logic of urbanization and modernization, 
-- Thomas Bender (7978, p. 32) 
Important developments may not be In broad ideological 
positions but in the specifics of how people are 
organized to conduct functionally important 
activities. Presumably, this is roughly what Marx had 
in mind when he wrote of turning Hegel on his head. 
- Clarence Stone (1989, p. 221) 
Urban Studies is more than a nominal account of life in the big city. It is a 
vast interdisciplinary field requiring a deep understanding of the 
interconnectivlty of individual biography, historical processes, material cultures, 
and spatial patterns. Interest in the city and city life -- among both theorists 
and practitioners - continues to grow with the changing political. social. 
technical. and economic dynamics of the world-system. But the failure of the 
postmodern movement to find the slightest hermeneutical evidence of 
anything in the urban experience - a failure perpetrated by partial theories, 
incomplete reports, incessant word-play, and inappropriate reductionism ­
demands a reconsideration of the metatheoretical approach to mediate 
opposing philosophical assertions of ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology. 1 Without such unity, the entire field of Urban Studies is too easily 
bifurcated into parallel Inquiries of natural science and social science by the 
cartesean duality of body and mlnd.2 Even as preeminent a scholar as David 
Harvey, whose cumulative work represents a tremendously important step 
towards holistic unity in urban thinking, falls into this trap in his two-volume 
Studies In the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization (198Q) where he 
considers the urbanization of capital and the consciousness of humans as 
separate issues.3 Thus, the bifurcation of the urban landscape into nomothetic 
and idiographic space - yet another manifestation of cartesean duality - is a 
major hurdle to the development of a unified metatheory of the urban 
condition.4 Harvey himself later recognized this in his introduction to The Urban 
Experience (1989), writing: 
2 
Theories provide cognitive maps for finding our way in 
a complex and changeable environment. The cognitive 
map may not be stable or even coherent. Experience 
leads us to construct. transform and modify It all the 
time....The problems (of partial theories and 
incomplete reports) become more acute when we seek some 
meta-theory of the urban process. by which I mean a 
theoretical framework that has the potential to put all 
such partial views together not simply as a composite 
vision but as a cognitive map that shows how each view 
can itself be explained by and integrated Into some 
grander conception of what the city as a whole. what 
the urban process In general. is all about (p. 2). 
My purpose in writing this paper Is to deconstruct and critically analyze the 
standard urban metatheories and to determine whether they in fact represent 
structurally integrated cognitive maps or are simply cut-and-paste assertions of 
partial theories and incomplete reports. I use the term deconstruction not In 
the context of defamiliarization popular in literary deconstruction as an actiVity 
without limits, but in a proactive role which 
"means that the deconstructive response initiated by
 
the discovery of figures of speech and signicatory
 
ambiguity within the explanatory structures of social
 
scientific discourse should aim at Isolating and
 
removing them and their further effects. as well as the
 
reconstruction of the affected parts, rather than at
 
the celebration of the freedom inherent in language"
 
(Woodiwiss. 1990, p. 33. italics mine).
 
Through my project I hope to move the field of Urban Studies from 
interdisciplinary study to nondisciplinary study. In doing so. I will Investigate 
whether the fragmentation of philosophical positions in metatheory corresponds 
to ontological distinctions In the reality of urban experience or is simply a 
reflection of the ideological epistemology of institutional modes of inquiry. The 
term Urban Studies itself seems to betray a methodological bias. The 
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semiological values of candidate titles for a reconstructed field of knowledge 
are similarly problematic. Perhaps closest to my desired meaning is human 
ecology, a term tainted by its past association with the Chicago School of 
Sociology. Urban Science is too closely associated with the positivist 
abstraction of mathematical models. Urban Affairs plain sounds too nominal. 
Urbanization successfully signifies becoming but at a devaluation of the city as 
object. Urbanism adequately conveys the character or condition of city life 
but fails to evoke the sense of large-scale material forces inherent in our 
understanding of social, economic, and political processes. Despite Its 
shortcomings I choose the term Urbanism and use it as both a "thing in Itself" 
and a "vantage point from which to capture some salient features in the social 
processes operating in society as a whole" (Harvey, 1973, p. 16). Thus Urbanism 
is both form and process (McHarg, 1971), and as such a succinct linkage of 
ontology and epistemology crucial to our understanding of cities and city life. 
In this paper I refer to the prevailing academic paradigm as Urban Studies and 
to a proposed nondisciplinary metatheory of fact and scholarship as Urbanism. 
I join Harvey In his call for a rationally defined urbanism: 
"The complexity of urbanism is not to be attributed to
 
the Inherent complexity of the phenomena in itself but
 
reflects merely our ability to weave an intricate woof
 
of argument around the urbanism concept. It follow
 
from this that we cannot promote an understanding of
 
urbanism through Interdisciplinary research, but we can
 
promote an understanding of disciplinary contributions
 
through a study of urbanism" (1974, p. 16).
 
4 
The problem of intact metatheory 
Every few years or so, scholars descend into the wine cellar of academic 
consciousness to ritualistically turn Hegel's dialectic upside-down in the hope of 
improving it with age. Materialists and Ideallsts5 alike take turns pointing the 
bottle this way or that, never qUite savoring the Irony that the teleological 
synthesis of such interplay itself moves In dialectical fashion, nor that wine is 
best poured on Its side, leaving behind the residue of both tainted theory and 
impure description. For this reason, Harvey enjoins us to privilege neither passive 
understanding nor active participation in the quest for knowledge but to ride 
the tension between the ·rich diversity of urban experience· and the 
·encompassing vision· of metanarrative In order to further human creativity in 
both theory and practice (1989, p. 4). There are two tasks Implied here. One is 
to integrate the virtual realities of idiographic and nomothetic space which are 
themselves derived from the self-constituting positions of individual theories. The 
other is to develop a pedagogical model which extends knowledge from 
theorists to practitioners In order to encourage the use of appropriate 
methodologies of inquiry and technology which themselves recognize the 
distinctive and mutually informative nature of theory and practice. Without a 
philosophical base - which I will show underlies all the standard metatheories 
which seek to describe and explain the urban condition -- there is little pretext 
for discourse.6 Even the validity of the traditional non-metatheoretical 
approach to learning - at least in Western societies -- is based on the 
philosophical assertions of Descartes' theistic dualism (Sprigge, 1984). It is 
5 
against this duality which Daly and Cobb argue in their call for an integrated 
curriculum of natural and social sciences, an argument I will renew in the 
closing remarks of this paper: 
"Our polemic... ls not against disciplined thinking but
 
against its canalization into departments and its
 
idealization of methods that encourage excess
 
abstraction...the organization of knowledge in the
 
university such as to work against its contribution to
 
the broad human need for understanding. The more
 
successful and exclusive are disciplinary goals, the
 
less the contribution of the discipline to true
 
understanding. The result is an 'information age' but
 
little comprehension of our real condition" (1989, p.
 
124-125).
 
My project incurs three risks, which themselves manifest the latent 
contradictions inherent in the naive amalgamation of partial theories into an 
interdisciplinary curriculum. Each of these risks must be addressed,·and the 
contradiction mediated, before moving on to the actual project of 
deconstruction. 
1. The ontological problem in deconstructing metatheory 
Koestler (1970) argues that in the process of reducing metatheory to its parts 
for analysis, the essence of its structural integrity may be inevitably lost, and its 
validity falsified. 
To respond to this objection, I argue with Derrida (1970) the epistemological 
and methodological necessity of utilizing cartesean duality despite the 
impossibility of making it acceptable as ontological truth. In other words, the 
language of metanarrative can be seen as criticizing itself. Thus the 
deconstructed parts of metatheory, while of questionable truth-value outside 
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their own context, retain value as methodological instruments to ·step outside· 
the realm of metaphysics. There is a danger here, in that postmodern thinking 
tends to see totalization as useless and impossible: useless because it invokes a 
vain quest for an infinite richness which it can never master and impossible not 
because of its infinite size but because of the absence of a true center on 
which to focus significance (Derrida, 1970; Sarup, 1989). In opposing this 
position, I argue with Kant that while sentience Is key to the construction of 
reality, there must exist a thing-In-itself which registers in our consciousness as 
the cause of our subjectivity. Entrikin summarizes the Kantian position as an 
understanding that ·reality is an irrational continuum made rational through the 
application of concepts· (1991, p. 95). In this paper I search for clues to that 
reality, employing the metaphors of idiographic and nomothetic space as 
·methodologlcal Instruments· while holding on to the possibility of reasserting 
the irrational as a valid and reliable ontological construct. 
2. The epistemological problem in deconstructing metatheory 
A metatheory may be uninformed by empirical evidence which establishes 
not only the validity of interesting facts standing alone, but patterns of detail 
which provide a contextualizatlon crucial to theory bUilding (Stone, 1989). 
Concerning the danger of empirically uninformed theory, I argue with HaNey 
that theory and evidence are both human constructs, that 'the idea that there 
is something called 'experience' unmediated by imagination (is) as 
unacceptable as the equally misguided view that facts and data exist 
independently of theory' (1989, p. 14). Stone himself makes this clear when he 
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says that "comprehensive description, even if highly detailed... lnvolves selecting 
some features and neglecting others. It entails, not just judgment, but 
prejudgment as well" (1989, p. 255). 
3. The methodological problem in deconstructing metatheory 
Empirical outcomes In social systems are always contingent, and the best 
we can do -Is to develop an adequate conceptualization of necessary 
relations and discover the coexistence of necessary and contingent relations In 
any given empirIcal context" (Pinch, 7989, p. 48-49). 
Deconstruction is the process of rhetorical close-readings that "seize upon" 
the fact that philosophy - like literature - represents a textual construction of 
reality. In other words, deconstruction Involves a "psychoanalysis" of logocentric 
narratives and attempts to draw out conflicting logics with "the object of 
showing that the text never exactly means what it says or says what it means" 
(Norris and Benjamin, 1988, p. 7). As Harvey (1989) points out. metatheory may 
well be a house of empty rooms requiring time to take up questions of 
contemporary relevance. In deconstructing urbanism, the tension between 
realist and positivist methodologies pulls apart the precarious union of partial 
theories and Incomplete reports, leaving us free to reconstruct a new program 
contextually relevant to our time and space. In this manner a deconstructive 
analysis "opens the possibility of further social, political-economic, 
sexual-political, and cultural revolutions, as opposed to closing them off in the 
aprioristic monumentality of a formal scheme" (Ryan, 1982, p. 8). 
8 
Rationale 
One manifestation of the nondisciplinary nature of Urbanism. which offers a 
useful case to approach the issues at hand. is the reassertion of space in critical 
social theory developed among others by Thrift (1983). Gregory and Urry (1985). 
Sounders (1986). and Soja (1989).7 In his work on the structure of scientific 
revolutions. Kuhn (1970) rejects the conventional notion that scientific 
breakthroughs are the result of an orderly. progressive aggregation of 
knowledge. Critical changes. he argues. come about when established 
paradigms no longer explain the anomalies which present themselves to the 
scientific community. The significance of the movement to place social action 
within a context of an historical spatiality is summarized by Harvey's observation 
that "the incorporation of space has a numbing effect upon the central 
propositions of any corpus of social theory" (1986. p. 142). 
According to Daly and Cobb (1989). the abstracted knowledge of 
contemporary society which passes for a deep understanding of 
anthropocentric ecology is derived from the disjointed research agendas of 
conventionally organized academic departments. Sayer (1988) sees the 
academic recognition of space as tied to a pedagogical movement 
concerned with developing theoretically informed empirical research. The 
reassertion of valued ideology. in the form of new paradigmatic thinking. is 
necessary to remedy the anomaly of positivist models which emphasize "a 
marked preference for measurement and quantification. and a tendency 
towards social structural explanations as distinct from those which refer to 
human intentions and motives" (Abercrombie. Hill. and Turner. 1988. p. 190). This 
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drive to unify theory and practice is at the heart of the issue because the 
university Is not only the marketplace for the extension of theoretical knowledge 
to the practitioner but for the feedback of empirical evidence to the theorist. 
Rothman and Hugentobler recognize the importance of this information 
exchange In their essay on Planning Theory and Planning Practice: 
·Planning finds itself Increasingly faced with the
 
absence of a guiding theory that would allow for a more
 
unified approach to practice. If planning is indeed to
 
give up the value-free technician's approach to social
 
problem solving, a more comprehensive theory about
 
social problems will have to be developed, capable of
 
providing a framework In which different professions in
 
the social arena are able to define and locate
 
themselves· (1986, p. 23).
 
Organization of the paper 
In this paper I rehearse four standard metatheories used in Urban Studies to 
explain the social production of space: human ecology, marxian structuralism, 
marxian political economy, and soclospatial dialectics. In each instance, I 
deconstruct the representative model into component parts, themselves partial 
theories borrowed from more specialized fields which Gottdiener (1985) lists as 
primary contributors to new paradigmatic thinking in the field of Urbanism: 
sociology, economics, and geography.8 The contradiction of materialist and 
idealist propositions evidenced in the component parts of metatheory can thus 
be seen as problematic to Its structural integrity and overall validity as a model 
of urban reality. 
From the dialectical clash of materialism and Idealism I seek to develop a 
contextual realism - which I address in my closing remarks - as the ontological 
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basis of Urbanism. To come to know this reality requires a mediation of what I 
have called Idiographic and nomothetic space, empirically- informed mental 
topographies which are epistemologically constructed by the tension between 
subject and object In the urban experience. I seek as metatheory that which 
structurally unifies subjective self and objective reality through the 
self-constituting aspect of human agency. To further that understanding, I 
conceptually define space, place, region, and locale and introduce an 
ontology of four-dimensional t1mespace. This replacement ontology limits and 
delimits epistemological approaches which have a positive influence on the 
choice of methodologies useful to urbanlstic study. In closing, I outline a 
pedagogical framework which I propose as a marketplace for the transference 
of knowledge between urban theorists and planning practitioners to spark a 
Kuhnian revolution in the study of cities and city life. 
The Idiographic and nomothetic meanings of space 
The conceptualization of theoretical terms such as space, place, region and 
locale - already garbled by the proliferation of proprietary metonymy - Is 
further exacerbated by the academic debate over Idiographic and 
nomothetic approaches to inquiry. Sayer (1988) offers some consolation by 
asserting that both contextuallzing and law-seeking approaches have validity, 
because some social structures (such as culture) are strongly influenced by time 
and space while others (such as world-systems) are more durable and 
pervasive. The existing field of Urban Studies has for the most part avoided 
ontological and epistemological positions by asserting as value-free both 
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idiographic and nomothetic research methods. However, this has had the 
effect of trivializing the issue of totalization through the institutionalization of 
fragmented theories as "multiple realities". I will eventually argue for a 
contextual realism which recognizes temporal variation in spatial ontology 
based on material differences in t1mespace and the reflexive nature of human 
narrative. But the validity and reliability of that ontology cannot be viewed as 
solely contingent on the subjective viewpoint of the observer without 
weakening the dialectical relationship between materialist and idealist 
propositions. As a minimal concession to materialism, Urbanism must assert the 
pragmatic view that theories represent potentially useful fictions to be retained 
or discarded according to considerations of convenience, purpose, simplicity, 
or elegance (Hammersley, 1979). But it can in no uncertain terms, as Castelis 
warn us, abstract spatial structure from social process, for 
"to consider (space) Independently from social
 
relationships even with the Intent of studying their
 
interaction, is actually to separate nature from
 
culture and thus to destroy the first principle of any
 
social science: that matter and consciousness are
 
interrelated, and that this fusion is the essence of
 
what history and science are each about" (1983, p. 4).
 
A key factor in nondisciplinary study is the creation of interconnective 
synergetic relationships so that the individual disciplines are logically 
recognizable both as separate academic fields of study and as indispensible 
parts of a greater whole. Thus in nondisciplinary study narrative and analysis 
are combined in a mutualistie relationship which Stone calls "explicit theorizing", 
recognizing that "in the cold light of experience, both theory and evidence are 
human constructs, inevitably imperfect and limited in their capacity to explain 
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the world around us' (1989, p. 254). The more complex a theorization the more 
it will resemble description. But the success of theory depends on a 
well-nurtured feedback loop linking hypothetical constructs and everyday 
human activity. People are not just actors reading prepared sociological scripts. 
Rather they improvise and muddle their way through contingent events in ways 
which frustrate prescience. Stories are lived as stories, not merely proposed as 
a narrative form of historical writing (Carr, 1986). Thus researchers who do their 
homework draw on both idiographic and nomothetic traditions because 
explanation alone is inevitably parsimonious. Stone points this out in his call for 
an understanding of history as the conjunction of factors which change over 
time: 
'1 do not deny that there are regularities In human
 
behavior; I only assert that something as complex as
 
the shaping of an urban regime must be understood as a
 
confluence that itself Is not permanent. By observing
 
the flow of events over time, we can see what
 
combination of factors have recurring weight and what
 
changing factors alter the course of events. But
 
complex causation and few cases make analysis
 
difficult. Moreover. the historical process is not
 
mechanical because the flow of events is much affected
 
by human intentions, understandings, and
 
misunderstandings. As they change, the conjunction of
 
factors change, complicating explanation' (1989, p.
 
257-258).
 
My position that the most complete description of reality entails both 
idiographic and nomothetic inquiry is not without its problems. The best 
carpenters and their handiwork are known by how few tools they use, not how 
many. I am well aware of the danger of 'rampant eclecticism' which 
Woodiwiss (1990) sees as permeating postmodern thinking. In an effort to avoid 
reductionism, it is also necessary to avoid redundancy, as both positions entail 
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ambiguity. This danger Is Inherent In the semiological play of dualistic thinking, 
which Matthews claims was apparent in the intended mediation of Idiographic 
and nomothetic space by Parks: 
"The existence of two analyzable 'orders' of social
 
forces In the real world, the ecological order of
 
unwilled, symbiotic Interaction and the moral order of
 
conscious meaning and willed institutions, which
 
affected each other, meant that the student of society
 
must employ both the analysis of consciousness and of
 
external competitive forces. He must both explain
 
social phenomena, In the sense of discovering the
 
causal forces which mold them, and make them
 
Intelligible, in the sense of revealing their
 
functions for and conscious meaning to the people who
 
live them (1977, p. 133-134).
 
The spatial analysis of urban ecology 
The ecological perspective was first advanced in the early twentieth 
century by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Roderick D. McKenzie, and others 
at the University of Chicago. It was the first comprehensive urban social theory, 
developed at a time 'when American sociology was gaining institutional 
recognition as a discipline but lacking an indigenous body of theory' (Sounders, 
1986, p. 52), quite similar to the current state of affairs in the fledgling field of 
Urban Studies. Our interest in human ecology as a standard model for the 
social production of space is twofold. First, it is the origin of "the dominant 
theory of urban development...that cities are the outward manifestation of 
processes of spatial competition and adaptation by social groups which 
correspond to the ecological struggle for environmental adaptation found in 
nature' (Cooke, 1983, p. 133). As such it demands our attention as the 
theoretical foundation of both contemporary urban ecology (Berry, 1977) and 
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regional science (Isard, 1975), and more loosely the analytical use of all 
econometric models. Secondly, a deep understanding of the collapse of the 
ecological paradigm has pedagogical Implications for the success of my own 
project of metatheory. In particular, human ecology suffered from the internal 
contradiction of realist epistemology and positivist methodology which 
stretched dialectical reasoning beyond the limits of usefulness. The lesson 
reminds us that the semiological play of postmodern theory can reach a point 
of diminishing return If we move too far to "step beyond" philosophy. This Is 
what Katznelson warns us when he describes the discovery by Levi-Strauss of 
the Tupi-Kawahib, "totally untouched by European civilization. But since he and 
they lacked a common system of signs, he found their culture unintelligible. 
Having found them, he could not know them" (1981, p. 5). The more eclectic 
our methodology, the greater the probability that the data we collect - what 
Leshan and Margenau (1982) call epistemic feedback -- will be invalidated by 
inappropriate instruments·of inquiry.9 
The foremost advocate of what became known as the Chicago School of 
human ecology was Robert Park, who studied pragmatic philosophy under 
John Dewey at the University of Michigan before entering a career In 
journalism. Park received his doctorate from Hiedelberg, where he 
encountered the symbolic interaction of Georg Simme!. Simmel proposed that 
the relationship between the invisible world of social symbols and individual 
human consciousness could only be studied phenomenologically in the formal 
structure of fleeting encounters (Collins & Makowsky, 1989). Thus SimmeL like 
Kant, embraced a critical philosophy which accepted the possibility of the 
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empirical induction of aprlorlstic knowledge (May, 1970). More specifically 
Simmel took the neo-Kantian position that the world was formless and open to 
multiple descriptions and that "the patterns that we perceive, and the cognitive 
structures that we use to make sense of our perceptions. were regarded as 
human constructions devised on the basis of human values· (Hammersley. 1989, 
p. 28). The neo-Kantians emphasized their rejection of positivism by asserting 
the causal validity of myth, religion, and history which Kant had placed beyond 
the realm of sure knowledge. lo But Park was also influenced by the writings of 
Emile Durkheim, from whom he derived his methodological framework, and 
Charles Darwin, from whom he derived his theoretical paradigm (Saunders, 
1986). The impending clash of social psychology and social ecology In Park's 
thinking becomes fully evident in comparing the phenomenology of Simmel 
with the positivistic approach of Durkheim. 
Durkhelm considered the human condition to be inherently egotistical, 
requiring social control in the nome of morality and organizational efficiency, 
which he called "conscience collective". In doing so he opposed the utilitarian 
tradition of British economic philosophy, which explained social phenomena by 
reference to the actions and motives of Individuals. In contrast. Durkheim saw 
sociology not as the study of Individuals but ·social facts·, asserting a realist 
perspective that societies "had their own realities which could not simply be 
reduced to the actions and motives of individuals. and that individuals were 
molded and constrained by their social environments· (Abercrombie, Hill, and 
Turner, 1979, p. 70-80). Unlike Simmel's phenomenological approach to the 
collection of empirical data, Durkheim zealously asserted a positivist 
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methodology inappropriate for his realist epistemology. Those concepts which 
Durkheim could not operationalize and measure he deemed meaningless. 11 
Thus, Park's incorporation of Durkheim's methodological approach becomes 
problematic for a critical understanding of the hermeneutic circle far more 
representative of the urban condition. 12 
Park moved even further away from a recognition of self, drawing upon the 
theories of Charles Darwin to assert that the same natural forces which shaped 
plant and animal communities played a significant role in the evolution of 
human communities. Here Park was more concerned with what he called the 
biotic than the cultural. However, this did not mean that human ecology 
denied "the relevance of consensus and culture in the study of social life; only 
that it concentrated on the unconscious and asocial aspects as its specific 
area of interest" (Sounders, 1986, p. 55). As later developed by McKenzie 
human ecology considered the structural growth of community 
"in successional sequence .not unlike the successional
 
stages in the development of the plant formation.
 
Certain specialized forms of utilities and uses do not
 
appear in the human community until a certain stage of
 
development has been attained, just as the beech or
 
pine forest is preceded by successional dominance of
 
other plant species. And just as, in plant
 
communities, successions are the products of invasion
 
so also in the human community the formation,
 
segregations, and associations that appear constitute
 
the outcome of a series of invasions" (Hawley, 1968, p. 14).
 
For Park, the city is a dynamic environment in which spatial equilibrium is 
continually restored through the "tooth and claw" struggle of the economic 
competition for scarce resources available to the human community. Sounders 
(1986) attributes this position to Park's understanding of Emile Durkheim's analysis 
17
 
of the division of labor. Durkhelm argued that urban populations stimulate 
competition through growth, leading to functional specialization. Likewise, Park 
held that ·an increase in population size within a given area, together with an 
extension of transport and communication networks, results in greater 
specialization of functions and thus stronger ties of interdependence· (Sounders, 
1986, p. 56). For Park, the best-adapted, fittest social groups inevitably 
dominated scarce resources such as land, creating socially and culturally 
homogeneous ·natural areas· such as the ghetto or the suburb. Park saw these 
patterns of land use and spatiality as the empirical manifestation of ecological 
forces he called concentration, centralization segregation, invasion, and 
succession. McKenzie refers to these forces as "the tendency in time toward 
special forms of spatial and sustenance groupings· (Hawley, 1968, p. 23). Thus, 
In human ecology individualistic human agency is constrained by a spatial 
organization itself determined In relation to the environmental resistance of such 
factors as geography, economy, culture, technology, and political reality. For 
Park these factors are objectified as concrete facts, highly susceptible to 
empirical measurement. But he also considers them "as if· they are social facts 
for the convenience of his methodological approach. In other words, ·the very 
apprehension of a social collectivity as a thing is necessarily conceptual rather 
than phenomenal. The commitment to holism thus necessarily undermines the 
empiricist methodology by postulating a reality beyond direct experience· 
(Sounders, 1986, p. 63). This thinking, which borrows from Durkheim's own 
wrestlings with realism and positivism, represents space as the monocausal 
effect of predetermined human activity. The inevitable outcome of these 
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processes, despite their appearance of dynamic activity, is the maintenance of 
static equilibrium (Cooke, 1983). In other words, human ecology places social 
relations beyond human control, reducing history to metaphor independent of 
the rich contextuallty of narrative texts. 13 While there is room for a social 
construction of nature in ecological thinking, the inescapable karma of 
technology and the built environment Is captured in McKenzie's analysis of 
human intervention: 
"Ecological processes always operate within a more or
 
less rigid structural base. The relative spatial
 
fixity of the road and the establishment furnishes the
 
base in which the ecological processes function. The
 
fact that the movements of men and commodities follow
 
narrow channels of rather fixed spatial significance
 
gives a structural foundation to human spatial
 
relations which is absent in the case of plant and
 
animal communities" (Hawley, 1968, p. 32).
 
In the sense that human ecology represented an attempt to develop a 
systematic and scientific explanation of urban patterns and culture it could be 
seen as a sub-discipline of sociology, concerned with the study of the city as 
opposed to the study of institutions, education, and family. But through its 
seminal investigation of how human populations adapt to their environments, 
human ecology also asserted a proprietary framework which transcended its 
role as a categorical sub-discipline. Thus human ecology represents both a 
branch of sociology dealing with the empirical problem of spatial analysis and 
a body of knowledge essential to all the social sciences. 
On the surface this seems to offer the holistic structure I seek to develop a 
metatheory of Urbanism. Yet instead of moving in dialectical fashion towards a 
teleological synthesis of aprioristic and empirically- derived knowledge, the 
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Inherent vitalism of human ecology atrophied in the rigidity of its economic 
reductionism. Contemporary criticisms argued that human ecology explained 
locational activity purely In terms of economic maximization, ignoring the 
symbolic value of space and the role of sentiment in rational decision-making 
(Sounders, 1986). Revived by Amos Hawley and Otis Duncan as contemporary 
urban ecology, it quickly "degenerated into the minute statistical examination 
of urban areas" (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 260) archetypical of all 
analytical approaches to space and spatiality. In all its variants, human 
ecology dehumanizes individual behavior in two ways: first it emphasizes 
socioblotlc forces manifested at the structural level of society rather than at the 
level of everyday phenomenology and secondly it employs both analytical 
abstraction and economic reductionism to operationalize its functionalist 
paradigm. 
The metanarrative of human ecology did unify geography, economics, 
culture, technology, and political reality, But it privileged geography "as if" it 
was a social fact, Le. as the reification and crystallization of homo economicu5 
(Lea, Tarpy, and Webley, 1987).14 But Park's position was never based on a true 
commitment to realist ontology. Instead, It was a matter of convenience to 
explain the failure of positivist methodology to measure biotic community with 
the same degree of success with which it could measure social activity. IS Had 
Park balanced Durkheim's collectivity with Simmel's SUbjectivity he would have 
better understood that as the empirical manifestations of culture "acquire fixed 
identities, a logic and lawfulness of their own,,,this new rigidity inevitably places 
them at a distance from the spiritual dynamic which created them and which 
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makes them independent" (Ritzer, 1988, p. 147). This is the danger of positivistic 
measurement: by Its nature that which can be measured quantitatively Is not 
social fact but the relflcatlon of social fact,· hence positivistic Inquiry can 
evidence but not accurately describe realist structures. Furthermore, the use of 
variable analysis inherent In positivist methodology suggests a tolerance of 
exceptions which are the growth points of science and which would otherwise 
force the reconceptualization of conventional theories (Kuhn, 1970). It remains 
for Marx to provide us with a revolutionary perspective beyond the static 
equilibrium of the ecological paradigm. 
A brief rehearsal of marxism 
An adequate rehearsal of Marx, while useful to an understanding of marxlan 
political economy, is obviously too grand an enterprise for the scope of this 
paper. Instead I will present a minimal overview of orthodox marxist thinking 
preliminary to a more critical analysis of key assertions in marxian political 
economy, marxian structuralism, and socio-spatial dialectics. Because of the 
rudimentary level of this exposition, I will avoid the citation of uncritical remarks. 
However, I wish to acknowledge Miller (1982), Ryan (1982), Abercrombie, Hill, 
and Turner (1984), Saunders (1986), Ritzer (1988), Collins and Makowsky (1989), 
and Lauria (1990) as sources for the following narrative presentation. 
As a student Karl Marx prepared himself for a career as a German 
academician: he drank in taverns, acquired debts, fought duels (earning the 
requisite scar), and studied philosophy. While at the University of Berlin, Marx 
became involved in an intellectual movement known as the Young Hegelians, 
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political activists who followed the Idealistic philosophy of Georg Hegel. Hegel 
spent a lifetime developing a comprehensive philosophical system which would 
Incorporate all knowledge - past, present, and future -- into a grand 
metatheory of reality, what today Is variously called by quantum scientists ·the 
history of time' or ·the theory of everything'. From Kant's assertion that the 
ethical basis and teleological rationale for human activity is derived from 
reason (as opposed to expediency, law, or culture) came Hegel's assertion of 
the Absolute Idea, the rational metaphysical essence of all reality revealed 
throughout history as the transcendental flow of reason to consciousness. The 
purpose of pedagogy, according to Hegel. Is threefold: (1) to articulate the 
Internal rational structure of the Absolute; (2) to demonstrate how the Absolute 
manifests Itself In history and nature (I.e.-time and space); and (3) to explain the 
final purpose towards which the Absolute is directed. Against Kant's 
epistemological limits of possible knowledge, Hegel argued for the ultimate 
Intelligibility of all existence, asserting that reality is understood as the Absolute 
objectifying itself In nature as material form and in history through a process of 
self-development called the dialectic. It is the dialectic which Marx seized 
upon in his optimistic hope for revolutionary change, substituting a materialistic 
base for hegelian idealism in his now famous quip that Hegel had simply to turn 
his dialectic right side up. 
In borrowing the dialectic, Marx retained Hegel's notion that social. cultural, 
and political development - hence all history -- depends on the internal clash 
of paired contradictions called thesis and antithesis, leading to a revolutionary 
synthesis which itself would inevitably split into a new disequilibrium of thesis and 
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antithesis. Marx did not deny the reality of linear causality popular in 
mainstream sociology but rather asserted the superiority of historical materialism 
as a structurally consistent metatheory of knowledge. By historical materialism 
Marx meant a materialist interpretation of history in which social facts 
Csuperstructure·) were determined by the production of material things 
Cbase·), albeit the superstructure might serve as a ·pre-condition· for the mode 
of production. Through this relationship. Marx privileged economics as 
"first-among-equals· in the social sciences. He defined the economy itself In 
terms of the three interrelated elements of labor. capital. and means of 
production. It is this reference to base/superstructure from which critics have 
inferred economic reductionism. even though such abstraction would clearly 
have defaulted the dialectic process. Whereas Simmel's dialectic operated In 
the microscopic world of dyads and triads. Marx's dialectic thrived on the 
richness and complexity of large-scale social structures and human actors 
moving teleologically through time. In dialectical thinking. humans are always 
in danger of being slain by those objects of their own creation. Simmel. like 
Max Weber, saw the world as an iron cage of objective culture from which 
there was no hope of escape. He called the phenomena by which social and 
cultural products develop their own significance and their own laws 
more-than-life to distinguish it from the social reproduction of thoughts and life 
he called more-life. In marxist terms, the ideological transformation by which 
we conceive of economic objects, social relations. social class. and social 
structures as natural. universal. and absolute is called reification. 
In the context of economic life. reificatlon is represented by the process of 
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commodify fetishism. For example, the only contact between a shoemaker 
and a potter Is the exchange of wares at the marketplace. These objects 
come to stand for the social relationship. When the shoemaker and the potter 
think about that relationship, their thinking about the products they made and 
received in exchange mask the reality of the social relationship. In large-scale 
capitalist societies commodity fetishism sugarcoats the appropriation of labor, 
making the bitter pill of exploitation easier to swallow. But the underlying reality 
- basically carried out at a subconscious level - is that the market depends on 
social relationships to regenerate moral capital just as it depends on material 
relationships to regenerate natural capital (Daly and Cobb, 1989). As Daly 
argues in his treatise on dynamic equilibrium, 
"of all the fields of study, economics is the last one
 
that should seek to be 'value-free', lest it deserve
 
Oscar Wilde's remark that an economist is a man who
 
knows the price of everything and the value of nothing"
 
(1991, p. 4). 
Marx wished to avoid the sort of epistemological confusion we find in 
Durkheim's methodology, whereby social facts are to be treated as things, 
hence to be studied not philosophically but empirically in a positivist framework. 
For Marx, such quantitative abstraction was, in essence, running numbers for 
the Man. 16 Although Marx is best known for his views on the relationship 
between economic life and other social institutions, he valued highly the 
potential of human self-consciousness (species-being) and the struggle for 
self-actualizatlon which neo-marxists now call "Individuation", Thus for Marx any 
masking of the human spirit, such as the alienation of workers from the 
enjoyment of their labor, the fruits of their labor, the company of their fellow 
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employees. or their personal individuation was seen as exploitative. 
Ukewise. I contend that Marx would have seen the abstract and 
quantitative methodological masking of the paramount reality of human 
self-consciousness as equally exploitlve. For Marx self-consciousness was 
determined not by hegelian consciousness independent of self but by human 
residence in the real objective world. By "false consciousness" Marx meant 
incorrect assessments by capitalists and workers (shall we add academicians?) 
of how the system worked and of their own roles and interest In It. To ensure 
against methodological masking through erroneous measurement we must 
interrogate empirical data and historical accounts with theoretical concepts. a 
methodological technique which has been called "realist concrete study" by 
Sayer (1988) and "explicit theorizing" by Stone (1989). 
The epistemological and methodological integration of Marx's dialectical 
framework leaves no room for space between social facts and social values. 
Unlike mainstream·soelological thinking. Marxism asserts both the impossibility. 
and the undesirability of keeping values out of the study of the human 
condition. Marx ridiculed as myth the idea of the dispassionate scientist. All 
research is value-laden. giving researchers a sense of commitment. motivation. 
and insight they would less enjoy as Impartial observers. 
Marx's commitment to human individuation through social emancipation is 
to be brought about through concrete action. or praxis. Such activism is to be 
approached intellectually through the development of a critical metatheory 
which will pre-condition society for change. and politically through specific acts 
of revolutionary significance. In his concern for the human condition Marx 
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hoped for a non-violent revolution. But In fact political marxists, growing 
impatient with the gradual pre-eonditioning of society, have asserted (as did 
Che Guevara) that the best theory comes from the barrel of a gun. Although 
Marx predicted that revolution would follow an historically necessary moment 
of class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat the most violent 
levels of frustration have erupted in the pre-eapltalist societies such as Russia, 
China, and the colonial and emergent states of the Third World. The belated 
renewal of Interest In Marx and marxism among Western academicians in the 
1970s and 1980s followed the indigenous expression of that same frustration in 
the United States and Europe. 
At this point I turn to a discussion of marxian structuralism, In part because 
its excessive determinism represents a caricature of the marxist position more 
quietly asserted in marxian urban political economy. By purposely begging the 
question of human agency, I hope to rhetorically construct against marxist 
theory a paradigmatic crisis which will precipitate a Kuhnian revolution in the 
field of Urban Studles. 17 In deconstructlng marxian structuralism I also intend to 
investigate just how far metanarrative can be stretched without Invoking the 
epistemological imperialism which seems to linger in the configured and 
reflexively structured closets of marxist theorists. 
Marxian structuralism 
If we have learned anything from the structuralist controversy it is that there 
is no priviledged mandalic model for understanding human history (Macksey 
and Donato, 1971). Marxian structuralism is no longer the rage because the 
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diversity of conclusions from epistemic feedback have raised "the possibility that 
what we had formerly considered to be general structures were themselves 
geographically specific, context-dependent phenomena that had mistakenly 
been treated as general· (Soyer, 1989, p. 255). I revisit marxian structuralism 
because it holds out the possibility of forensically answering the question as to 
what commonality was fatally inherent in both the marxian and ecological 
models of structural determinism. If so there is the added motivation that the 
identification of the common crises which destroyed human ecology and 
marxian structuralism might lead to the development of new thinking to 
replace marxian urban political economy as the prevailing paradigm in social 
science. 
In sociological terms, structural theory refers to social structures, or "enduring, 
orderly and patterned relationships between elements of a society· 
(Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988). Popularized in the 1950s as 
functional-structuralism by Its ass~ciation, with the eminent sociologist Talcott 
Parsons, the concept of social structure is rarely discussed in positivist sociology 
because of the inherent difficulty in verifying causal significance without the use 
of empirical methods. Although Parsons made specific reference to large-scale 
structures as opposed to the structures of everyday experience, structuralism is 
seen as denying human creativity and free agency through a form of 
determinism. A mediation of structuralism and human agency may be found, 
however, by recognizing the social construction of reality, pointing to the 
freedom of humans to themselves create social structures through subjective 
activity (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
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Marxian structuralism must be viewed in two ways - as a kind of marxism 
and as a kind of structuralism (Ritzer, 1988). As a kind of structuralism, marxian 
structuralism falls in a larger framework of linguistic, anthropological, 
sociological, and dialectical theories which all seek universal and invariant laws 
that operate from the most primitive to the most advanced level of humanity. 
Structural marxists (who, seeing themselves as being truest to Marx's project, 
eschew the reformulated term 'marxian') assert that the "truly important realities 
of capitalist life are to be found in Its underlying structure and not in the 
observable facts that often obscure the true nature of that structure" (Ritzer, 
1988, p. 259). Thus structural marxists criticize marxian tendencies to employ 
positivist methods and empirical data. Finding themselves strange bedfellows 
with Parsons (who was a strong critic of marxism in all its variants), they argue 
against naive historical research, not only because as a discipline it is 
empirically oriented, but because historical processes cannot be fully 
understood without a prerequisite knowledge of underlying structure. Finally, 
having denied the freedom of agency as anything more than "objectively 
antagonistic relations', structural marxists reject all accounts of individualistic 
behavior, including human subjectivity and economic reductionism. To 
understand the impact of such thinking on urban studies in the heyday of 
marxian structuralism, we will look at the work of Louis _Althusser and the early 
work of Manuel Castells. 
Althusser's adheres to a contextual understanding of marxism which suggests 
that in reading Marx we need to know what Marx is thinking, not just what he 
says (Gottdiener, 1985). He postulates "two Marxs' -- an immature Marx strongly 
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influenced by hegelian idealism, and a scientific Marx who formulated a 
dialectic history based not on heroic Individualism but the collective will of the 
masses. Capitalism, In Althusser's view, was not an historic force but a social 
formation of economic, political, and Ideological elements - each acting with 
relative autonomy until the clash of internal contradictions creates an 
unresolvable dilemma (overdetermination) leading to the temporary 
dominance of one element in the formation and uneven development in 
capitalist space. The most violent critical reactions to the marxian structuralist 
position are against Althusser's insistence on the meaninglessness of history and 
the dehumanization which accompanies an ahistoric perspective. Althusser 
seems to have developed a structuralism of statis inconsistent with Marx's own 
historical materialism (Ritzer, 1988). Since structure itself is dialectic and 
indeterminant - becoming rather than being - Althusser begrudgingly assigns 
actors a precarious agency subject to the caprice of the structural system. It 
was left to Manuel Castells (1977). to more fully articulate that system in his 
critique of capitalist space. 18 
Castelis used marxian structuralism to criticize existing urban theories and 
practice and to develop new theory without ideological representation. Here 
Castells asserted the marxist concept of ideology, suggesting that current urban 
theory is subordinate to the class interests of the bourgeoisie and fails to break 
with the superficiality of material reality. This subordination precludes a deep 
understanding and articulation of the underlying structure (Saunders, 1986). 
Unlike Lefebvre, who attacked ideological planning for its colonial occupation 
of the spatiality of everyday life, Castelis takes the more orthodox position that 
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Ideology Is foremost a capitalist tool to coopt the class consciousness of labor 
In the workplace. Attempts by marxian thinkers to incorporate both viewpoints 
brings us to a discussion of marxian urban political economy. 
Marxian urban political economy 
The ghetto riots of the middle sixties proved a "rude awakening" for urban 
scientists who believed in a reified, conservative version of the realities of city 
life (Gottdiener, 1985). The growing split between critical and conservative 
social scientists over the relevance of social Inequality to urban analysis was 
exacerbated by the general strike of 20 million French workers In May of 1968, 
leading to a revived interest In marxian approaches to urban political economy 
(Gottdlener, 1985).19 
The use of a marxian perspective in urban analysis is not without its 
problems, because Marx said comparatively little in terms of economic, 
politicaL and social commentary on city events and virtually nothing on the 
geography of city form, except for a few axiomatic remarks tying the form of 
settlement space to its mode of production (Gottdiener. 1985). For the most 
part marxian theorists were left to their own devices, developing innovative 
approaches in the attempt to replace the contrived explanations of regional 
science and human ecology - "a school of thought so deeply immersed in free 
market reasoning that its practitioners seem not to have been aware that there 
was even an alternate approach" (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 4). As 
marxism is essentially a critique of capitalism, marxian urban political economists 
used as their starting point an attack on neo-classlcal models of urban ecology 
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which saw the city as little more than a convenience of commerce. The failure 
of mainstream analysis to compare social structure to class structure or the 
urbanization process to capital accumulation gave its critics two avenues of 
attack. Accordingly, Gottdiener (1985) divides marxlan critiques of 
neo-elassicism between class conflict theories and capital accumulation 
theories, a taxonomy I will follow in my presentation.20 
1. Class conflict theory 
In his analysis of spatial patterns and class conflict in the Washington 
Heights-Inwood district of northern Manhattan, Katznelson (1981) searched for a 
"convincing theory of the social structure of capitalist societies" (p. 207) to offset 
the failure of marxist logic to explain why nowhere in the industrialized West has 
the proletariat lived up to Lenin's revolutionary standard. What Katznelson 
found was that 
"the turmoil and defiance (of the times) revealed not
 
only the fragility of the social order and the
 
vulnerability of local property, but also the poverty
 
of the Keynesian assumption of a shared public interest
 
in managed capitalist growth" (p. 91).
 
In other words, the urban crisis of the sixties and early seventies was not only 
a matter of financially and morally bankrupt City Halls, but a class conflict 
involving racial consciousness and neighborhood territoriality which restructured 
settlement space in favor of the ruling capitalist hegemony.21 In explaining the 
failure of the working class to address grievances and raise demands to 
improve city services relative to their everyday life, Katznelson asserts a false 
consciousness of "city trenches" that treats workplace and community as 
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separate and distinct spheres. The unavoidable conclusion of such analysis is 
that social groups are Institutionalized by the habitualization of social and 
political behaviors peculiar to their territorial space (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966).22 With or without their consent, Katznelson's underclass is exploited by 
their sentimental attachment to residence and everyday life. 
There are three key points to be addressed concerning Katznelson's theory 
of class conflict. The flrst Is that Katznelson describes the settlement and growth 
of northern Manhattan using the same ecological paradigm he later abandons 
in his marxian explanation of the unevenness of spatial and economic 
development In ethnic enclaves. Uke Levi-Strauss, Katznelson declares as 
value-free the methodological duality of realist and positiVist inquiry. As a result, 
he is able to analyze the ahistorical construction of nomothetic space while 
detailing the contemporary action of individualistic everyday reality as 
idiographic space. Thus Katznelson avoids the need to consider concrete 
reality "as if" it was social fact a epistemological parlor trick which proved 
problematic for Durkheim and Park. By privileging here and now as the 
paramount reality (I.e. "first-among-equals") Katznelson emphasizes the 
revolutionary potential of human agency against the backdrop of historical 
materialism. Harvey summarizes this position in stating that: 
"Capitalism frequently supports the creation of new
 
distinctions In old guises. Pre-eapitalist prejudices,
 
cultures, and institutions are revolutionized only in
 
the sense that they are given new functions and
 
meanings rather than being destroyed. This Is as true
 
of prejudices like racism, sexism and tribalism as it
 
is of institutions like the church and the law.
 
Geographical dlfferentlatlons...frequently appear to be
 
what they truly are not: mere historical residuals
 
rather than actively reconstituted features within the
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capitalist mode of productlon....The upshot is that the
 
development of the space economy of capitalism is beset
 
by counterposed and contradictory tendencies. On the
 
one hand spatial barriers and regional distinctions
 
must be broken down. Yet the means to achieve
 
that end entail the production of new geographical
 
differentiations which form new spatial barriers to be
 
overcome. The geographical organization of capitalism
 
Internalizes the contradictions within the value form.
 
This Is what Is meant by the concept of the Inevitable
 
uneven development of capitalism. (1982, p. 416-417).
 
secondly, Katznelson's concept of hegemony is borrowed from Gramscl, who 
advocated a return to the hegelian roots of early marxism In order to revitalize 
dialectical thinking with the reassertlon of subjectivity.23 Gramscl (1971) 
rejected the 'historical necessity· of revolution, arguing that the exploited 
masses could not develop a revolutionary ideology without the help of a social 
elite called the Intelligentsia. Implicit In Gramscl's thinking is the assertion of 
Hegel's Idealistic man-of-self-consclousness over Marx's materially determined 
self-eonsciousness-of-man. Having followed Gramsci down the road of 
hegelian marxism, Katznelson finds difficulty locating his theory of social 
structures in a paradigm which privileges collective ideas rather than the social 
structures he seeks. Uke human ecology, Katznelson has trapped himself In 
internal contradiction. For Park, the problem was the epistemological tension 
between realism and positivism. In class conflict theory, the problem Is the 
ontological tension between materialism and idealism, owing to Gramsci's 
assertion of dual consciousness. As Entrikin shows, marxian urban political 
economists such as Harvey associate the geographic specificity of individual 
neighborhoods -- what Park called 'natural places' -- with the false 
consciousness of place identity, seemingly powerful 'only because the actors 
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thought them to be so.... Consciousness, including place consciousness, is not 
to be considered a causal factor" (1991, p. 50). But such denial weakens "the 
essentially unpredictable interactions of the spatial with the economic and the 
political and social/cultural spheres" which Dear and Wolch (1989, p. 4) see as 
crucial to the power of geography. Katznelson finds himself denying the 
existence of the same human potential he argues must be liberated from the 
exploitative hegemony of capitalist space. 
Finally, Katznelson uses the class conflict approach to develop a capitalist 
conspiracy of social control in both industrial and residential land-use decision 
making. Gottdiener (1985) offers a mocking critique of conspiracy theories, 
which 
"hypothesized the existence of a capitalist class which
 
was capable of behaving monolithically in order to
 
orchestrate events so that they better fit the needs of
 
that class. In some cases the capitalist class is
 
endowed with a prescience capable of making its
 
politically orchestrated decisions functional for the
 
survival of the system. This approach suggests that
 
everything which enhances the ability of the capitalist
 
class to control society has been willed into being,
 
or, If that sounds too conspiratorial (and many
 
marxists prefer things to sound that way) then
 
capitalism itself can be anthropomorphized so as to act
 
as a whole and determine what is best for it as a
 
system In an evolutionary fashion by weeding out
 
whatever is not" (Gottdiener, 1985, p. 73-74).
 
The conspiracy theory is problematic for Katznelson's analysis because it 
undermines the richness and complexity of his narrative. In marxism ·class· has 
a very specific meaning, distinguishing those who owned and controlled the 
means of production In society and those who did not (Saunders, 1986). 
Katznelson's workers represent Marx's class-in-itself -- ·all victimized by capitalist 
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fragmentation but acting Itself to perpetuate Its own fragmentation· (Marcus, 
1975, p. 459). He reports no observation of class-for-itself -- those who exhibit 
class consciousness and a commitment to the direct production of useful 
change. The failure of Katznelson to operationalize class in a more contextual 
setting (a method asserted by Weber, as we will see shortly) leaves him with 
only two reifled actors: the capitalist and the worker. Inevitably, Katznelson is 
forced to abandon dialectical thinking and explain spatiality and land-use 
patterns in terms of monocausal class exploitation. 
2. Capital accumulation theory 
Capitalism is a self-constituting nexus which drives the opportunistic 
expansion of the means of production, the wage labor force, and the logistics 
of sales anq distribution to produce a surplUS value crucial to its reproduction. 
This massing of surplus value is called capital accumulation. The locus of this 
activity, called capitalist space, is the ·creation of activists who push hard to 
alter how markets function, how prices are set and how lives are affected· 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 3). Harvey (1973) refers to capitalist space as 
·absolute space· in which monopoly control can operate without the high cost 
of relocating people, goods, services, and information.24 The relationship 
between capital accumulation and urban spatial patterns is further explained 
by Lefebvre: 
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·Capitalism has found Itself able to attenuate (if not 
resolve) its internal contradictions for a century, and 
consequently, in the hundred years since the writing of 
Capital, it has succeeded in achieving ·growth", We 
cannot calculate at what price, but we do know the 
means: by occupying space, by producing a space" (1976, 
p,21), 
From this perspective, capital accumulation theorists look to explain 
urbanization as the spatial manifestation of the accumulation process 
(Gottdiener, 1985). These theorists include those influenced by 
neo-Ricardianlsm (Cooke, 1983; Sheppard and Barnes, 1990) and quantitative 
marxism (Sheppard and Barnes, 1990; Dunne, 1991),25 In this section I will 
summarize marxian urban political economy as developed by David Harvey in 
a series of writings (1973, 1982, 1989, 1990) which built upon classical marxist 
concepts, to which Harvey adds more contemporary aspects of advanced 
capitalism (also called Late Capitalism) not treated by Marx,26 In the earliest 
work (1973), Harvey attacks the Chicago school for its nominalism, arguing that 
human ecology only treated the surface level of everyday life but not the 
underlying economic and social realitles.27 This theme is consistently repeated 
throughout Harvey's writings, culminating in his charge that postmodernist 
cultural forms and flexible modes of capital accumulation are merely shifts in 
surface appearance but in no way manifest a postcapitalist or even 
postindustrial society (1990). 
Harvey defines the city as a built environment located by the spatial 
intersection of the social, economic, technological, and institutional aspects of 
the capitalist mode of production. Harvey explains the rise of the historical city 
from an undifferentiated tabula rasa in terms of mainstream Von Thunen 
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geographic analysis. But he views as inevitable the uneven development and 
social inequalities of sociospatial patterns due to the scramble of competition 
among capitalists to mobilize, extract. accumulate, and concentrate surplUS 
value In order to reproduce capital through the production of space and 
control of land-use. The effects of the logic of capital accumulation are not 
only adversely distributed spatially and demographically, but temporally in the 
form of boom-and-bust cycles. 
Capitalism, In the marxist critique, is subject to Inexorable laws of capitalist 
production concealed by the superficiality of Individual economic behavior. 
This inherent logic results in situations uniquely contradictory to the initial causal 
circumstance. For example, the aggregative self-interest on the part of 
individual entrepreneurs - such as actions resulting in the maintenance of 
unsafe work environments or extended periods of layoff -- can in fact endanger 
the social basis for future accumulation. A second contradiction is that the 
accumulation of capital Increases the tempo of capitalistic exploitation In 
response to the competitive fragmentation of the workforce, resulting in the 
creation of class consciousness and class-for-itself to resist the onslaught of 
capitalist violence. For Harvey, these contradictions provide critical insight Into 
the laws of capital accumulation, which he summarized "in the ridiculously short 
space of three or four pages' and I In the totally absurd confines of one. 
The capitalist production process seeks to create absolute surplus value by 
increasing per capita labor output and relative surplus value by increasing 
productivity through reorganization and fixed capital (technological 
improvements). This ·primary circuit of capital' serves to transform wages into 
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wage goods (necessities) which sustain ("reproduce") labor power and luxury 
goods for the consumption of luxuries. To Increase absolute surplus, the 
contradictlon of capitalist logic exploits the labor force, resulting in 
overproduction and failing rates of profit, as well as surplus capital and surplus 
labor during periods of recessionary slowdown. Over time, surplus value flows 
through a secondary circuit to establish fixed capital (capital assets which 
Harvey calls "built environment for production"). Fixed capital acts as an aid to 
productivity and a consumption fund of consumer durables and community 
infrastructure ("built environment for consumption') to enclose the consumption 
process. Part of this capital - for example the transportation network -- can be 
transferred back and forth between categories by change in use. Capital 
overaccumulates in the primary circuit because "switching" (rerouting the flow 
of investment) to the secondary circuit Involves risk, a loss of liquidity (in marxist 
terms "the Immobility of space and time"), and shareholding in the public 
domain. A tertiary circuit is used to reswitch investments for social expenditures, 
technological research, and the repression and ideological control of the labor 
force in direct relation to the threat of working-class resistance. Strictly 
speaking, this summary refers only to the production of capitalist space, but not 
to its reproduction nor demolition. 
As opposed to Katznelson's monolithic capitalist class, Harvey (1989) asserts 
three personifications of capital who employ rents, interest, and profit to realize 
surplus value In the reproduction of space. The first fraction of capital consists 
of rentiers: landlords who collect rents directly and real estate speculators who 
appropriate rents indirectly. The second fraction consists of planners and 
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developers who seek interest and profit through construction or financial 
backing. The third fraction Involves the circulation of ·capital in general· 
through state intervention to insure the survival of the capitalist class: such as 
pork-barrel projects, tax-free enterprise zones, and the construction of military 
bases In economically depressed areas. 
Desai (1991), in his quantitative model of alternate disaggregation strategies, 
shows how circuits of capital and falling rates of profit behave in an economic 
model called dynamic disequilibrium. An economy is in disequilibrium when 
the stock of capital decreases despite positive net investment (surplus value) In 
a given time period. A dynamic model is a model in which current values of 
economic variables depend on the values of those variables in previous periods 
of time, such as the shock of a recession or the upswing of a business cycle 
(Sawyer, 1989). The economic chaos of dynamic disequilibrium is what Marx 
predicted for capitalist societies due to the contradiction of the logic of 
capital. In particular, capital accumulation proves problematic for the even 
development of space, due to the creation of immobile capital assets of the 
built environment originally implanted on the landscape as an aid to 
production and consumption (Harvey, 1982; Smith, 1984). Such infrastructure 
eventually acts as a barrier to further accumulation due to its cost of 
maintenance and repair as well as the opportunity cost of lost surplus value. 
The permanence of the built environment can be removed only slowly unless 
there is a dramatic devaluation of the exchange value frozen in the capital 
assets of the infrastructure, such as accidental destruction by fire or unplanned 
technological obsolescence. To capitalists such structures are called ·white 
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elephants" - to Harvey they represent "the power of dead labor over living 
labor", leading capital to negotiate 
"a knlferedge path between preserving the exchange
 
values of past capital Investments in the built
 
environment and destroying the value of these
 
investments In order to open up fresh room for
 
accumulatlon....The effects of the internal
 
contradictions of capitalism, when projected into
 
the specific context of fixed and Immobile investment
 
in the built environment, are thus writ large in the
 
historical geography of the landscape that results"
 
(1989, p. 83). 
As I have already mentioned, Harvey describes a dualistic urban 
experience which reflects his concern for both capital accumulation and class 
conflict in the development of his marxian political economy. Yet the 
"urbanization of capital" and the "consciousness of urbanization" are more than 
an imaginative reflection of the dialectic between base and superstructure. 
For Harvey they represent the precise methodology by which empirical facts 
are interrogated by theory. Harvey asserts, as did Marx, that the task of theory 
construction begins with the study of the everyday life of ordinary people. This 
requires more than a naive phenomenology devoted to the superficiality of 
appearance, for in first observing people 
"their conditions of life and labor, their joys,
 
discontents and aspirations remain hidden....This
 
masking arises because our social relations with those
 
who contribute to our dally sustenance are hidden
 
behind the exchange of things in the market place....
 
There is no trace of exploitation upon the lettuce, no
 
taste of apartheid in the fruit from South Africa"
 
(1989, p. 8). 
In order to get behind the surface and unmask the fetish, Harvey advocates 
the selection of material things with which we are familiar in everyday speech 
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and which we use as concrete abstractions. Through materialistic reduction, 
we take the 'path of descent from the complexity of everyday life to a simple 
set of concrete representations of the way material life is reproduced" and next 
"postulate abstract and non-observable concepts that help us see how 
individuals working under all manner of special conditions, intersect and 
interact to generate certain dynamics within the social system... 
conceptualized as a whole" (Harvey, 1989, p. 9). Although the validity of these 
concepts cannot be established through direct encounter, "the proof lies In the 
using, Le. by showing how the underlying concepts can, when put in motion, 
help understand all kinds of surface occurrencies that would otherwise remain 
incomprehensible. Explanatory power becomes the central criterion of 
acceptability" (Harvey, 1989, p. 10). From this point on, the process of inquiry Is 
reversed to ascent through elaboration to the point where they can, in Marx's 
words, come to "reflect daily life as in a mirror". 
Deconstructing Harvey 
There is much to be admired in Harvey's nearly perfect presentation, but 
several areas seem to manifest the latent contradictions I earlier suggested 
plague the amalgamation of partial theories into metanarrative. To Harvey's 
credit, his metatheoretical framework is such that these contradictions cannot 
be neatly categorized as ontological, epistemological, or methodological. 
Rather each represents an anomaly which problematically interpenetrates his 
entire theoretical endeavor. I identify and isolate them notsomuch as a 
criticism of Harvey but - in consideration of Harvey's success -- to argue against 
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any premature discontinuance of my project on the grounds of fait accompli. 
What I Intend to show is that there are - to use Harvey's own metaphor ­
empty rooms in marxian urban political economy which must be furnished by 
new thinking. This will involve a paradigmatic shift away from the materialistic 
reduction of marxian structuralism and towards an emphasis on Marx's early 
concern for individuation. 
1. The problem of reductionism 
Wallerstein offers an interesting insight into marxian thinking, pointing out 
that 
"Karl Marx in his life work was caught up in the basic
 
epistemological tension of any and all attempts to
 
analyze large-scale, long-term processes of social
 
change: simultaneously to describe the characteristics
 
and the principles of a "system" In its unique process
 
of development. This tension between a theory that is
 
necessarily abstract and a history that is necessarily
 
concrete cannot by definition be eliminated. Just like
 
most other thinkers facing and aware of this tension in
 
their intellectual activity, Marx resorted to the
 
tactic of alternating emphases in his writings. It is
 
easy therefore to distort his interest, by pointing to
 
only one end of this pendulum and presenting it as the
 
"true Marx" in ways he would have rejected, and
 
frequently did" (1991, p. 151).
 
I face the same dilemma In my criticism of Harvey. Moreso, because his 
wealth of writing rehearses not only all the ground covered by Marx but what 
Wallerstein calls "additional empirical reality which means that the previous 
theoretical abstractions must be modified" (1991, p. 151). But Harvey's project 
seems stubbornly unconcerned with self freely distinguishable from 
consciousness despite Marx's early commitment to individuation. In other 
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words, for Harvey the self-consciousness of man is inevitably determined by 
structural causality and the appearance of free agency is little more than 
self-delusion. Brain states and brain physiology are unmediated by human 
values, beliefs, and goals. In fact Harvey's urban consciousness is simply a 
collective economic reduction formed around the primary growth points of 
individualism, class, community, state, and family: 
"Within the confusion, all kinds of other sentiments,
 
illusions, and distortions can flourish. The ferment
 
of discontent and opposition, of understandable and
 
entirely reasonable misrepresentations, of unintended
 
consequences, is always part of the urban brew.
 
Therein lies an extraordinary though often latent
 
energy for social transformation. Capitalist
 
urbanization gives rise to forces that, once put in
 
place and set in motion, can just as easily threaten as
 
support the perpetuation of capitalism. We have, in
 
short, to confront the urbanization of consciousness as
 
a key political problem" (Harvey, 1989, p. 230).
 
In introducing the issue of everyday life to his marxist framework, Harvey 
commends Simmel for addressing the issue but rejects phenomenology as 
naive. This leaves for Harvey the problem of how to derive an understanding of 
the urbanization of consciousness In relation to the urbanization of capital. 
Desai argues this position in his critique of quantitative marxism: 
"reality is not directly observable...what is more,
 
reality may be distorted; it may be inverted at the
 
phenomenal level. Thus prices are observed and values
 
are not exchange is equal but production and
 
extraction of surplUS value are unequal. This implies
 
that merely looking at observable facts may be
 
seriously misleading" (1991, p. 28).
 
Like Desai Harvey dismisses both empirical and phenomenological 
methodologies and falls back on the classical marxist use of money fetishism as 
a methodological instrument. His position against the paramount reality of 
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everyday life is summarized by Mohun, who warns that "a theory predicated on 
methodological Individualism cannot reproduce the understanding of one 
based on class struggle" (1991, p. 59). Convinced we live in historical time as 
opposed to real time, Harvey is forced to argue the material abstraction of 
human agency as the one sure way of uncovering true reality. But this 
compromises the structural Integrity of subjective self and side-steps the 
question as to "how much damage to historical materialism is caused by the 
fact that the phenomenon of attachment to (meaningful) ways of Iife... ls 
materialistically unexplainable?" (Cohen, 1983, p. 241). Daly and Cobb (1989) 
argue that the absurdity of both neoclassical and marxist reductionism is clearly 
evidenced by gross assumptions in the theory of exchange value. One is the 
assumption that an individual's total wants are insatiable, which Daly and Cobb 
refute by asserting that "If nonsatiety were the natural state of human nature 
than aggressive want-stimulating advertising would not be necessary" (1989, p. 
87). In support of this assertion, Lea, Tarpy, and Webley (1987) reject greed as 
basic to the human condition, citing empirical studies of consumptive "bliss 
points" from which any change Is for the worse, hence at which points 
consumers are satisficed. Daly and Cobb also argue against the reductionist 
claim that only commodities consumed by an individual contribute to that 
individual's "utility function". The oversimplification of human needs prompted 
Sen to argue that 
"The purely economic man is indeed close to being a
 
social moron. Economic theory has been much
 
preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory
 
of his one all-purpose preference ordering. To make
 
room for the different concepts related to his behavior
 
we need a more elaborate structure" (1990, p. 37).
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Harvey's constant refusal to go beyond material self-interest is the result of 
his dogmatic reliance on an historical materialism which links the ideal of 
individual emancipation with the pursuit of material Interest, But humans may 
be indifferent egotists and interest may be relatively unimportant, 
In knowing - better than we - what we think Harvey is very close to 
employing epistemological imperialism, a phrase used by Saunders (1986) to 
describe the presumption of privileged knowledge implicit in the position of 
Althusser and Castells. For the most part Harvey's theoretical project seems to 
function without regard for human response to contingent events. While he 
calls for a return to the street to disprove postmodern hype and voodoo 
economics, Harvey covers the last 10 chapters The Condition of Postmodernity 
in a collage of 74 pages. If not satire, then it is a quick sketch of the empty 
rooms which he himself has yet to furnish. My concern is that left uninformed 
by empirical observation Harvey's latent brand of structuralism would eventually 
come out of the closet to replace the world of individual responsibility with a 
clockwork orange of social and economic protocols 
·composed of ever smaller, ever more subtly 'adapted'
 
gears; as an ever-growing superfluity of all dominating
 
and commanding elements; as a whole of tremendous
 
force: whose individual factors represent minimal
 
forces, minimal values· (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 17).
 
2. The problem of reflexive thinking 
Gunn (1989) argues that by linking theory to practice marxism, like 
hegelism, unifies theory and metatheory because Marx used reflexive thinking in 
which theory refers to itself as a form of self-critique. But no matter how 
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sophisticated its critical methodology reflexive thinking is forced to accept as a 
starting point an ontology which is at best based on exploratory research and 
at worse derived from aprioristic guesswork. Imagination takes on a crucial role 
in reflexive thinking precisely because the use of empirical research as an 
absolute backdrop from which to confirm or refute theoretical hypotheses is 
",impossible, for all empirical research is theoretically derived" (Lauria, 1990, p. 
11). But by limiting and delimiting its epistemology, reflexive thinking is in 
danger of measuring reality on a procrustean bell-curve of self-fulfilled 
prophesy. ,Harvey claims to resolve the dilemma of phenomenological 
encounter by pointing to "surface occurrences" which explain the underlying 
concepts of realist structure. But the realist argument that contingent facts 
logically presuppose necessary structure (which, incidentally, Thomas Aquinas 
used to "prove" the existence of God) also supports the position of human 
ecology. In fact Harvey and Park share agreement on the empirical patterns 
of space and territory which they observe in capital urbanization. Where they 
disagree is only on the cognitive meaning of those patterns as representative of 
underlying reality.28 
I contend that neo-elasslcal and marxist theory both use economic 
reductionism as a form of instrumentalism, in which imagination plays a key role 
in mediating the difficulties of immediate experience.29 In realist epistemology 
this instrumentalism takes the form of "metaphors disguised as concepts, themes 
that carry along with them a whole unrecognized baggage of presuppositions" 
(Norris, 1991. p. 75). Observation is particularly problematic to reflexive thinking 
because it breaks with the dominant paradigm. When empirical evidence 
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agrees with his theoretical assertions Harvey Is free to argue that the 'proof" Is 
"in the using". When the evidence disagrees, he finds it contingent and 
superficial. Thus Harvey brushes aside observed anomalies as less useful than 
explanation in refining theory, in precisely the way Kuhn has suggested that 
theorists 
"do not.. .treat anomalies as counterinstances, though 
in the vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what 
they are....once It has achieved the status of 
paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only 
if an alternate candidate is available to take its 
place" (1970, p. 77) 
As a prevailing paradigm in social theory marxian urban political economy Is 
relatively immune to the crises fermented by deconstruction. This is because a 
deconstructionist reading 'suspends the persuasive (or meaningful) force of 
language in the interests of a purified logic of figure" (Norris, 1991, p. 103). In 
the case of realist literature, metaphor and metonymy are used in double 
entrendre, continuously shifting meaning between politics and science. This 
purposeful ambiguity, called reversal, is revealed as a ·paradoxicalloglc which 
undercuts Its own referential or realist pretensions" (Norris, 1991, p. 85). 
Marx's critique of the positivist method uses a method similar to reversal 
called inversion. An example of inversion Is the neo-classical assertion that 
price is a cause and not merely a result. Similarly, 
"Marx is equally critical of the positing of positive 
'things' (land rent, wages, profit, and so on) which 
are not seen as being produced by networks of social 
relations that displace their immediacy and inscribe 
their presence to consciousness in a complex systematic 
structure and a multistranded history" (Ryan, 1982, p. 
51). 
While Marx Is concerned with material reality and Derrida with philosophical 
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essence, both criticize positivism for its naive reading of narratives. Reflexive 
theorization and deconstructionism, on the other hand. both rely on a reality 
which unfolds with the text (Norris, 1991). As such. neither pays much attention 
to positive, self-evident facts which can be attacked by falsificationism.30 Kuhn 
makes this clear when he argues that counterinstances by themselves 
"cannot and will not falsify...philosophical theory.
 
for its defenders will do what we have already seen
 
scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will
 
devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications
 
of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent
 
conflict. Many of the relevant modifications and
 
qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature.
 
If, therefore, these epistemological counterinstances
 
are to constitute more than a minor Irritant, that will
 
be because they help to permit the emergence of a new
 
and different analysis of science within which they are
 
no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a
 
typical pattern, which we shall later observe in
 
scientific revolutions, is applicable here, these
 
anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply
 
facts. From within a new theory of scientific
 
knowledge, they may instead seem very much like
 
tautologies, statements of situations that could not
 
conceivably have been otherwise" (1970, p. 78).
 
3. The problem of aerial differentiation 
In developing his theory of uneven development, Harvey rejects the tabula 
rasa of human ecology, arguing instead that geological time has presented 
humanity with "a richly variegated geographical environment which 
encompasses great diversity in the munificence of nature and in labour 
productivity" (1982. p. 416). But for Harvey capitalism tears down and 
reconstitutes the diversity of natural landscape through a mechanistic 
construction of nature which often mimics strategic cultural forms through the 
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production of surplus value within a "closed" reglon.31 This process would lead 
to the sustained equilibrium argued by Daly and Cobb (1989) except for the 
entropic universalism towards which capital always strives: 
"Regional boundaries are Invariable fuzzy and subject
 
to perpetual modification because relative distances
 
alter with improvement In transportation and
 
communication. But regional economies are never
 
closed. The temptation for capitalists to engage in
 
interregional trade, to lever profits out of unequal
 
exchange and to place surplus capitals wherever the
 
rate of profit is highest is In the long run
 
Irresistable. And workers will surely be tempted
 
to move to wherever the material living standards are
 
highest. Besides, the tendency towards
 
overaccumulation and the threat of devaluation will
 
force capitalists within a region to extend its
 
frontiers or simply to move their capital to greener
 
pastures" (Harvey, 1982, p. 417).
 
In other words, for Harvey specificity of place and region is materially 
derived from the capitalist tendency to mechanize nature. In an effort to 
break down spatial barriers and regional distinctions which hinder the logistics 
of capital development, capitalism invests time and effort at opportunistic 
locations (growth poles) which briefly achieve economic and spatial 
equilibrium. This success leads to conditions of accumulation antithetical to 
further accumulation because the "long-run effect" of competition on a closed 
von Thunen landscape forces the average rate of profit closer to zero. In effect 
there are too many big fish in a little pond. At this critical moment. capital 
self-interest renews the search for profits by switching surplus capital and labor 
between the three circuits of capital. This is accomplished both by the pursuit 
of locational advantage and the appropriation of rent for production capital. 
The resulting colonialism 
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"erodes differences based on variations in the natural
 
environment and on the historical experiences of a
 
group, differences that contribute to the specificity
 
of places. The dialectically related forces of
 
equalization and differentiation work simultaneously to
 
homogenize and to differentiate spaces, Equalization
 
processes such as the development and diffusion of new
 
technologies work to level the differences among
 
places, while the need for competitive advantage
 
stimulates areal specialization and differentiation"
 
(Entrikin, 1991, p. 48).
 
The pursuit of locational advantage through movement to areas of 
relatively Inexpensive land rents and labor costs reduces the cost of production, 
Increasing competitive advantage and eventually corporate profits (Entrikin, 
1991, p. 48). Where the spatial crisis cannot be managed rationally, the 
anarchy of dynamic disequilibrium which accompanies this process often leads 
to the "brutal devaluation" of capital and labor. Thus Smith warns that there is 
no "instant magic" of a spatial fix (1984, p. 133). But the pursuit of locational 
advantage - at least as a' regional strategy --Is often moot because land, and 
not capital nor labor, is fast becoming the scarcest factor in locational analysis. 
Thus a technological fix, and not a spatial fix, is more likely to improve 
productivity and reduce costs as a source of relative surplus value, It is my 
argument that capital reswitching represents a technological fix which forestalls 
the necessity of spatial relocation crucial to the von Thunen model of 
economic growth. 
What I am attempting to show, once again, is the risk of using partial theory 
- in this case von Thunen analysis - in the formation of metatheory. Such a 
possibility Is problematic to Harvey's theory of accumulation and aerial 
differentiation because he specifically endorses the neoclassical model to 
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explain the primitive formulation of capitalist space.32 But von Thunen modelled 
only the relations of one-commodity production, Ignoring a more complete 
emphasis on distribution and exchange In a multi-commodity economy 
(Cooke, 1983). In neo-Rlcardian economic models derived from Sraffa (1960), 
a form of technological fix called capital reswitching Is used to show that the 
same technique of production may be the most profitable at two or more 
separate values of the rate of profit because capital in fact consists of 
heterogeneous produced commodities (Sheppard and Barnes, 1990). 
In neoclassical economics reswitchlng is impossible because wage and 
profit rates vary Inversely: as the profit rate falls, capital-intensive techniques are 
more efficient than labor-intensive techniques. But in neo-Ricardian theory, 
production techniques can no longer be ranked by their relative capital. The 
resulting Implications are summarized by Sheppard and Barnes: 
1 - The locational advantage of surplus labor no longer guarantees optimal 
profits to labor-intensive production methods: the same is true for surplus 
capital. "Thus free-trade decisions made on the basis of the availability of 
production factors need not be the most advantageous strategy" (1990, p. 28). 
2 - Since there is no necessary correlation between surplus labor and a high 
rate of profit, market mechanisms will not automatically ensure the equalization 
of geographical imbalances between rapid-growing capital- intensive regions 
and slow-growing labor-intensive regions. 
3 - The neo-Ricardian reassertion of landlords and land rent adds a third 
dimension to the wage-profit frontier which means that "it is not necessarily the 
case the the highest-paying land use for a plot of land is the most productive 
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way of using that land. This suggests that the use of a land market to allocate 
land to the highest bidder need not lead to an efficient land-use pattern" 
(1990, p. 28). 
Each of these assertions questions the validity of the von Thunen model used 
by Harvey in his theory of accumulation and aerial differentiation. Inherent in 
the neo-Ricardian position Is the economic irrationality of probabilistic human 
behavior which leaves nagging doubts about the validity of Harvey's economic 
determinism. In other words, Harvey must accept the challenge to consider 
capital accumulation as a function of technological rather than spatial 
SWitching. In fact, Harvey (1989, 1990) has developed such an approach under 
the heading of flexible accumulation. Inherent in the technological are 
poststructural concepts such as "difference" and "otherness·, which imply that 
culture is more than a contingent episode in historical time.33 Therefore Harvey 
must also be prepared to explain the differentiation of postmodern 
geographies considering other than capital interest as the predominant cause. 
Quite possibly Harvey is well on his way, having endorsed the need for 
"a recognition that the dimensions of space and time
 
matter, and that there are real geographies of social
 
action, real as well as metaphorical territories and
 
spaces of power that become vital as organizing forces
 
in the geopolitics of capitalism, at the same time as
 
they are the sites of innumerable differences and
 
othernesses that have to be understood in their own
 
right and within the overall logic of capital
 
development" (1989, p. 355).
 
The sociospafial dialectic 
Writing at the close of the heated debate between structure and agency 
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which had consumed nearly a decade of academic endeavor, Thrift (1982) 
recognized the crystallization of four specific positions: 
1 - A revulsion to structuralist thought on the part of 'empiricists, who deal 
only in the given as it gives itself and who continually mistake a minute 
description of some regularity for theory' and 'humanists, who pine for an 
anthropological philosophy with the category 'man' at its heart' (p. 24); 
2 - A marxian interpretation (similar to that of Parsons) that social theory was 
never meant to be applied at the microscopic level -- that Marx clearly 
distinguished between a theoretical treatment of individuals as personifications 
(what Harvey described as concrete abstractions) and a treatment of 
individuals as individuals; 3 - The call for a shift from theories about social 
action to theories of social action (for example 'structuration' theory); and 
4 - The position of Thrift himself. that it Is possible to produce general 
knowledge about unique events through the interpenetration of structuration 
with marxist determination. 
Structuration, a term originated by Giddens (1984), expresses the mutual 
dependency, rather than opposition, of human agency and social structure. 
Social structures are for the most part socially constructed, hence determinative 
of human activity only in the sense of culturally specific or generally 
unconscious human activity. In this sense the integration of individual and 
societal levels by Berger and Luckmann (1966) extends "the concerns of 
phenomenological sociology to social structures and institutions' (Ritzer, 1988, p. 
247), a project which follows Simmel rather than using the positivistic 
instrumentation of Durkheim and Park. But by treating objective reality as 
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essentially a subjective phenomena, Berger and Luckmann are in danger of 
weakening Simmel's dialectic of symbolic Interactionism to the point of what 
Smith (1981) called the "degeneracy of radical eclecticism", 
It is my contention that Thrift (1982) seeks to correct the weakness inherent in 
social constructions of reality by the theoretical reassertion of a realist paradigm 
which delimits idealistic social structure within the unrelenting materialism of 
geographic fact. Such thinking Introduces my final analysis, which deconstructs 
the metatheory of sociospatlal dialectics. 
At this point in our investigation I have analyzed three opposing paradigms 
- human ecology, marxian structuralism, and marxian political economy - as 
candidate systems of knowledge. I find each of these positions lacking for 
critical reasons already stated and continue our search for a metatheory of 
social action in space and time, suspecting - like Thrift (1982) -- that our best 
lead is a theoretical interpenetration of structuration and determination. Along 
those lines, Gottdiener (1985) and Sounders (1986) call our attention to a 
theoretical framework developed by Rex and Moore (1967) as an outgrowth of 
their empirical study of housing and race relations in an inner-city zone of 
transition. In it, they interrogate the ecological paradigm of invasion and 
succession using Weber's sociological emphasis on the meaningful action of 
individuals and lay the foundations for 
"an urban sociology which could retain its distinctive 
concern with the spatial dimension to social 
relationships while at the same time drawing upon a 
body of theory located within mainstream sociology in 
order to analyze such relationships" (Sounders. 1986. 
p. 114).34 
Max Weber's definition of "meaningful" action limited his interest in the 
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subjectivity of the actors two forms of asocial action. In wertrational the actor 
rationally chooses the means but not the end (Ritzer. 1988). In zweckratlonal 
the actor, by assessing the utility of the goal, choose both the means and the 
ends (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1989). Weber had little interest in 
·meaningless· actions caused by irrationalities of habitualization and emotion. 
By disallowing humans the freedom of Irrationality -- an ethnocentric error 
problematic to the validity of any intercultural study -- Rex and Moore 
theoretically reify their subjects as concrete abstraction for the sake of their 
positivist methodology. Thus we are back to the problem of measurement 
which proved fatal to the vitalism of the ecological paradigm. 
A fuller understanding of individual behavior in economic decision-making, 
which I will use as the theoretical basis for my discussion of the sociospatial 
dialectic, is summarized by Logan and Molotch (1987) in their succinctly put 
admonitions that ·price Is sociological" and ·the markets themselves are the 
result of cultures· (p. 9). In the first Instance they reject the neo-c1assical 
reductionism of homo economlcus. In the second they deny the assertion that 
regional specificity Is "associated trivially with a unique location and with the 
false consciousness of place identity" (Entrikin, 1991, p. 49). Logan and Molotch 
seek to develop a utility theory of use value and exchange value in the "long 
tradition of community sociology· (1989, p. 248) ignored by both neo-classlcal 
and marxian economists. In doing so they expand Weber's study of rationality 
to include the irrational, which in turn provides a sociological basis for theories 
of both rational and adaptive economic behavior (Begg, 1982; Gwarthy and 
Stroup, 1987). In terms of the capitalist space economy, where economic 
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situations and outcomes are multi-dimensional, this further accounts for both 
formal and Informal economies discussed by Portes, Castells, and Benton 
(1989). The result Is that Logan and Molotch consider the full range of urban 
spatiality rather than the "Iron cage" of limited free agency implied by Weber's 
interest and qualitative utility of the urbanization of capital. Use values reflect a 
Wider range of rational and Irrational interests understood only in the context of 
human consciousness. Whereas the commodification of exchange value is 
defined In units of currency, Logan and Molotch define the use value of 
residential neighborhoods In terms of dally routine, informal support networks, 
ethnlcity, trust, and Identity. This is a recognition that space and spatiality are 
more than social product and in fact represent a concrete realism which plays 
a major part in shaping social space. Orthodox marxism, on the other hand, 
identifies these "sentlmentalities"35 with consumption, giving ·relatively little 
attention to space as an analytical problem and treating the owners of real 
estate as an essentially reactionary residue of a disappearing feudal order" 
(Logan and Molotch,.1987, p. 10). Yet despite the marxian complaint against 
the tendency In "bourgeois social science" to assign ·characteristics· to places 
and things rather than sticking with the dynamics of a process as analytical 
focus (Soja, 1989), the metaphysical characteristics of everyday life are being 
reasserted through the growing acceptance that space matters. 
In the economic landscape perceived by Logan and Molotch, ·capitalist 
places" are essentially a social construct, created by activists who affect 
structural change in markets, prices, and patterns of consumption. These 
activists - who Logan and Molotch call "place entrepreneurs· -- appear similar 
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to Harvey's personifications of capital. Both undermine the absolute space of 
capital monopoly by exploiting relational space In the built environment. For 
Harvey, spatial disequilibrium is the effect of capitalist contradiction. For Logan 
and Molotch, it is inversely the cause, Instigated by entrepreneurs who 
strategically seek to cash In on declining rates of profit the capitalistic search 
for locational advantage, and the consumer's attachment to sentimentality. 
Albeit capitalist place is a social product, Logan and Molotch suggest a 
structuration between human agency and social structure which ensures that 
the material use of place cannot be separated from the psychological use, in 
doing so parting company with Harvey's argument that "residential 
differentiation is produced...by forces emanating from the capitalist production 
process, and is not to be construed as the product of the autonomously and 
spontaneously arising preferences of the people" (1989, p. 123). Logan and 
Molotch point to a growing literature of empirical studies in contemporary 
settings in which people passionqtely identify with their community, suggesting 
a cultural area Is endowed with the power of causality in social relationships 
through the self-constitution of human self. By reflecting a desire to "maintain a 
connection to Marxian theory and at the same time give greater theoretical 
weight to human consciousness" (Entrikin, 1991, p. 50) Logan and Molotch are 
theoretically aligned with Thrift's project to interrogate marxist determinism with 
a theory of structuration. 
One of the immediate outcomes of this interrogation is the understanding 
that the use value of community, highly sustainable if left unmolested, is . 
constantly threatened by rentiers, ersatz capitalists, and other place 
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entrepreneurs who profit from the generation of marginal exchange values in 
the built environment for consumption through speculation and structural 
Intervention. In doing so, they create urban crises through the systematic 
destruction of social ecologies - alienating residents from the psychological use 
value of their communities - and the replacement of traditional spatiality with 
the more insipid aspatiality of modern city planning. The crisis is social in that it 
disrupts the phenomenology of everyday life and ideological in that it ensures 
what Lefebvre called the reproduction of the dominant system of social 
relations. Uke all other contradictions of capital, the crisis is fermented by the 
massive shortage of commodities - in this case evidenced by the unequal 
spatiality of the built environment for consumption -- under conditions of 
extreme overpricing. This transformation is euphemistically called growth. 
Personifications of capital organize and orchestrate this transformation 
through interlocking networks which Logan and Molotch -- after Harvey (1989) ­
call ·growth machines·. These networks are largely free from empathetic 
·concern for what goes on within production processes, for the actual use 
value of the products made locally, or for spillover consequences in the lives of 
residents· (1987, p. 18). Social cleavage and contradictory exchange interests 
between bona fide residents and absentee rentiers are reinforced ecologically 
by spatial distance, as Zunz (1982) found in his study of Detroit ethnic 
communities. The main thrust of absentee rentiers is to create asymmetrical 
market relations between buyers and sellers so that ·people pay what the 
landlord demands, not because the housing unit is worth it, but because the 
property is held to have idiosyncratic location benefits· (Logan and Molotch, 
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1987, p. 20) such as access to friends, jobs, and schools. It is this manipulative 
strategy, which delimits the social action of home buyers and apartment 
hunters, which led Harvey to argue that capitalist exploitation precludes any 
legitimate expression of cultural process: 
·people are constantly searching to express themselves
 
and to realize their potentialities In their day-to-day
 
life-experiences in the workplace, the community, and
 
the home. Much of the micro-variation in the urban
 
fabric testifies to these ever-present impulses. But
 
there is a scale of action at which the individual
 
loses control of the social production process (in the
 
community this means the congeries of interests
 
represented by speculators, developers, financial
 
institutions, big government. and the like). It is at
 
this boundary that Individuals come to sense their own
 
helplessness in the face of forces that do not appear
 
amenable, under given institutions, even to collective
 
political mechanisms of control. As we cross this
 
boundary, we move from a situation in which individuals
 
can express their individuality and relate in human
 
terms to each other to one In which individuals have no
 
choice but to conform and in which social relations
 
between people become replaced by market relations
 
between things· (1989, p. 123).
 
But to maintain his position Harvey must assert realist epistemology 
cognitively unavailable to most actors who live in the paramount reality of 
everyday life. How and when do we cross the boundary between molecular 
and molar scales of reality to sense the helplessness of our alienation? The 
boundary which Harvey sees as problematic to the individualistic realization of 
species-being is the same line of demarcation which Sir Henry Maine (1905) 
used to distinguish between the ·status· of informal relationships and the 
·contract" of modern societies. Maine's work was continued by the German 
sociologist Ferdinand Toennies, who attempted to develop a theory of 
evolutionary social relations to compliment Marx's work in economics. Marx 
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had explained the transformation of "natural relationships· into ·money 
relationships" through the processes of commodification and industrialization. 
Toennies similarly asserted the sociological relationships of gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft, which despite their agreeable translation into ·community· and 
"society" have endeared in most of thle English literature in the original 
German.36 
Gemeinschaft represents the relationships found in family, kinship groups, 
and neighborhoods while gesellschaft refers to the formal market relationships 
of the impersonal city. The key difference, according to Bender (1963), is that 
in gemeinschaft people "remain essentially united in spite of all the separating 
factors, whereas in gesellschaft they are essentially separated in spite of all 
uniting factors" (p. 65). This tension represents the symbolic interaction of 
exchange value and use value which cannot be explained solely by the 
material dialectic of equilibrium and differentiation. Bender argues that 
Toennies never meant to mutually exclude gemeinschaft and gesellschaft. But 
in neo-classical thinking - notably modernization theory (So, 1990) -- the 
progressive movement of history is seen as involving the necessity of replacing 
the spatiality of traditional community with a structural-functionalism somehow 
inherent in modern society. This creates an ideology that urbanization is a 
zero-sum game in which growth in gesellschaft requires an equal reduction in 
gemeinschaft until society is completely transformed. Seeing this process as 
Inevitable if not totally desireable, modernists endorse quantitative methods in 
an attempt to direct a value-free approach to development and growth, 
treating the city as a Von Thunen landscape without due consideration for the 
primarily qualitative aspects of use value associated with the idiosyncratic 
nature of neighborhood space. While not all quantitative models Ignore 
human preference,37 they tend to privilege nomothetic space over Idiographic 
space, serving the theoretical and ideological needs of capital to justify the 
occupation of gemelnschaft (through the false consciousness of place) and 
the reproduction of gesellschaft (through cycles of equilibrium and 
differentiation). This is accomplished through development plans such as urban 
renewal which push for overproduction and preoccupy consumers with the 
expense of speculation and relocation. But the spatialization of capital ­
made problematic by the high cost of land, construction, environmental 
clean-up, regulatory control, and litigation -- has proven increasingly expensive 
with the transference of scarce capital resources from the primary circuit "to 
the urban arena of collective consumption as a major site both for the 
realization of value and for an Increasingly spatialized class struggle" (Soja, 1990, 
p.97). As a result, capital looks ~ore and more to coopt rather than confront, 
seeking to increase aggregate rent and trap related wealth for those in the 
right position to benefifS, namely 
1 - marginal entrepreneurs who become rent collectors by Inheriting 
property or serendlpltously benefitting from increased land valuation; 
2 - active entrepreneurs who use urban science to identify potential 
"money-makers" and engage In land speculation; and 
3 - structural entrepreneurs who speculate on their ability to change spatial 
relationships through strategies of intervention (Logan and Molotch, 1987). 
In general, place entrepreneurs act to break-up idiographic space 
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preparatory to a capital-intensive take-over In the name of growth. This is 
accomplished through the mechanization and homogenization of culturally­
specific neighborhoods which Harvey sees as preparatory to future crises of 
accumulation. But the burdening expense and diminishing return of a spatial fix 
has forced speculators and investors to marginalize loss by seeking to exploit 
gemeinschaft as a multi-eommodity product to be marketed for the realization 
of a fictitious exchange value based on subjective use value.39 Urban activists 
aware of this strategy seek to stop exploitation through alliance with the middle 
class in order to "utilize community organization and community movements as 
vehicles for radical change" (Katznelson, 1981. p. 193). To coopt such 
opposition place entrepreneurs themselves form coalitions with the petty 
bourgeoisie. Logan and Molotch are pessimistic about the probability of 
popular success because the "extreme Independence of local government 
agencies" permits "both planning and home rule...to benefit affluent 
communities, and to benefit especially the local elites -- of any community ­
who can manipulate municipal policy to their entrepreneurial advantage". 
Logan and Molotch argue that the "issues that reach public agendas do so 
precisely because they are matters on which the elites have, in effect. agreed 
to disagree" (1987, p. 199). This paints a dismal picture of Weberian 
rationalization in which the quality of gemeinschaft is constantly endangered 
through rent intensification by "organizations and institutions ...whose routine 
functioning reorganizes urban space" (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p. 51). 
Having criticized Rex and Moore (1967) for a positivist approach to what are 
essentially qualitative phenomena, it is difficult to fault Logan and Molotch 
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(1987) for their subjectivity in describing the nature of human settlement and 
market organization. But being at this point more interested in the teleological 
synthesis of the interplay between opposing metatheories than the correctness 
of anyone position, I argue that the failure of Logan and Molotch to 
incorporate nomothetic space In their narrative is no less problematic than the 
failure of Rex and Moore to assert Idiographic space in their paradigm of 
human ecology. Understandably up to this point the reader has found me 
even more slippery than Castells, but for a decidedly different reason. I have 
withheld personal assertion in order to ensure a value-free interrogation of 
metatheory. But In truth I have placed value on that metatheory which 
structurally unifies subject and object through the self-constituting aspect of 
human nature. This minimal assertion was necessary to preclude a project of 
mindless defamiliarization and to specify the reconstruction of the affected 
parts of deconstructed metatheory at the proper place and time. 
Here then is a philosophical d!'emma with serious impact on all projects of 
theoretical interrogation. If we accept the Kantian argument that all we can 
know of reality is limited by cognition, it becomes clear that our perception of 
ontological truth is colored by epistemological and methodological thinking 
derived from parochial allegiance to a particular discipline. This is why I have 
chosen the metaphors of "Idiographic" and "nomothetic' space rather than the 
ontologlcally constructs of "idealistic" and "materialistic' space.40 I seek to 
develop a unified approach to Urbanism which transcends the value-free, 
positivistic research associated with "interdisciplinary" studies. Furthermore I 
intend to clearly establish the ontological as more than an idealistic construct 
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notwithstanding the marxist contention that the mind itself is materially 
determined. Preliminary to my final remarks -In which I will assert a geography 
of contextual realism - I first must conceptualize my definitions of space, place, 
region, and locale. 
Space, place, region, and locale 
The literature is replete with morphologies of spatial organization, most of 
which spill over into subjective meanings of cognitive, proxemic, and 
psychological space which I have carefully avoided in my presentation. 
mention them now -- encouraged by Harvey's recognition of difference and 
otherness - to round out my discussion and show the true richness and 
complexity of ontological and epistemological issues of spatiality. 
,. A definition of space 
Space I define as both a tangible container of environments and 
landscapes (absolute space) and an invisible field of human interaction 
(relative and relational space). There is a problem here as my position is open 
to the charge of false duality, because metaphorically geography appears to 
be a material construction and history appears to be an idealistic 
construction.41 Both materialists and idealists argue that reality is not a gestalt 
switch and that the nature of ontological truth cannot see-saw back-and-forth 
between realism and idealism. In reply I will argue two positions. The first ­
which I have contended from the outset -- is that the betweenness of place is 
an epistemological construction. The second is that at a deeper level of reality 
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timespace in fact is persistently and essentially an ontological construction. 
sayer (1984) uses the term "conceptual leakage" to describe the 
inappropriate transference of dualistic relationships from one theoretical 
conceptualization to another. I argue that the assertion of realists and idealists 
that nature is ontologically either/or cannot be used as a relevant attack on 
my position that place Is epistemologically both/and. Relative and relational 
space are not primary qualities of reality in the sense that shape, mass, and 
motion - or even absolute space - are primary qualities of reality. (I am here 
ignoring the quantum argument that these "primary" properties are themselves 
reducible and that perhaps not even the flavor of a quark or its very existence 
is essential). Unless it turns out that matter just is space -- in which case physical 
objects are just pieces of space - material reality consists of hunks of matter 
which themselves define space by their configuration and interconnectivity with 
other hunks of matter. We may think of space as absolute, but through the 
very act of investigation we negqte its tenuous status as a primary quality of 
reality. If we are outside a space (if we are comparing New York and New 
Orleans) it is relative. If we are inside a space - and if we are involved in 
motion we are necessarily inside some space - it is relational. Relative and 
relational space are secondary qualities much like light and color are 
secondary qualities (Sprigge, 1984). Whereas primary quantities are 
nonconventional - in that they are not vague but ontologically sure ­
secondary quantities come into existence by human declaration. As Harvey 
reminds us, "the problem of proper conceptualization of space is resolved 
through human practice with respect to it" (1974, p. 13). Color is both a minute 
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physical property of material surface and the biochemical effect on the brain. 
Ught is both particle and wave. This Is not to assert a false ontological duality. 
because both particle and wave are admittedly human conventions. It is the 
changing difference in which we view light which establishes an 
epistemological duality. a phenomenon which has been empirically shown in 
numerous quantum experiments. 
Urban theorists have borrowed from quantum physics the metaphor of 
timespace without any real commitment to a material ontology to otherwise 
replace three-dimensional geographic space. As a result we are treated to a 
vocabulary of competing terms such as ·time-space· (Wolch & Dear. 1989). 
·time-space compression· (Harvey. 1990). and "TimeSpace" (Wallerstein. 1991). 
The meaning of each of these terms is imprecise. but seems to center on what 
Soja sees as a ·critical reorganization· of history and geography into a 
paradigm of synchronic structuralism (1989. p. 18). Standard metatheories 
which consider that objects move through three dimensions of space and one 
dimension of time resolve the ·false duality· of timespace by thinking of it 
epistemologically. Taking the reorganization of history and geography beyond 
metaphor requires the replacement of realist ontology with a four-dimensional 
material reality. In such a construction we can no longer talk of space or time 
but only space and time. Objects move not through three dimensions of space 
and one of time but through four dimensions of timespace. albeit human 
perception of the temporal dimension is unidirectional and discontinuous. To 
understand this clearly we must think ontologically rather than 
epistemologically. challenging the philosophical basis of reality itself. 
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An exciting approach to a new ontology Is developed by Heller (1990), who 
proposes that rather than thinking of three-dimensional objects as enduring 
through time, we must think of four-dimensional objects which consist of both 
spatial and temporal parts. In other words, New Orleans did not exist at 1718 
and 1992 but from 1718 to 1992. Its history is as ontologically persistent and 
essential as its spatiality. All of the human activity that ever occured in New 
Orleans consists of temporal parts connected by the glue of causal flows and 
collective consciousness. In other words, what appears superficial may in fact 
at a deeper level of reality be causal and what appears to be contingent may 
in fact at a deeper level be necessary. This is explained by Popper and Eccles, 
who argue that 
·For a long time, essentialism had been identified by
 
all parties, including its positivist opponents, with
 
the view that the task of science (and of philosophy)
 
was to reveal the ultimate hidden reality behind the
 
appearances. It has now turned out that although there
 
are such hidden realities, none of them Is ultimate;
 
although some are on a d.eeper level than others· (1977,
 
pp.554-555).
 
I argue with Bohm (1980) the position that there exist an inexhaustible matrix 
of relatively autonomous contexts In an Implicate order of material reality. Our 
existence contributes to causing particles of this underlying reality to emerge 
from an indivisible whole into the phenomenal reality of our temporal and 
spatial existence (Wallace, 1989). Euclidean space is a special class of 
geometric space and geometric space is a special class of human space 
(Leshan and Margenau, 1982). In other words the see-touch realm of 
experience in which we live emerges from a materially organized spatiality 
which Itself Is created from a larger contextual realm of possible worlds. These 
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are worlds of human convention, their essentialism governed by complex 
legislative actions (Heller, 1990). Beyond them lies the precise boundary of 
nonconventlonal reality. I am suggesting, with Schlagel, that 
"physical reality consists of a series of levels,
 
each composed of distinct layers of entities with
 
unique properties that account, to some extent, for
 
the kinds of structures and Interactions one finds on
 
the succeeding higher levels. That they account only
 
partially for the higher domains implies that new
 
features emerge that are not fully explicable.... lt is
 
as if we were gaZing into an enormous sphere, the
 
interior structures of which changed as, aided by
 
various instruments, we penetrated more deeply into its
 
interior. The outer level Is the most painterly,
 
consisting of the richest diversity of qualities and
 
forms, as well as the greatest variety of
 
interrelations, while each successive level becomes
 
less Intricate and varied, though disclosing new
 
SUbstructures and interactions. This progressive
 
decline in complexity Is compensated for by an evident
 
Increase In simplicity, unity, and coherence among
 
the elements, contributing to their greater
 
intelligibility. Each of these contexts Is somewhat
 
autonomous, although discernible interactions and
 
interconnections between levels provide the basis for
 
deeper or fuller understandings. It Is these necessary
 
connections, discovered a posteriori, that constitute
 
our scientific knowledge" (1986, p. 294).
 
In choosing the metaphors Idiographic and nomothetic I hope to 
underscore the self-constituting aspect of human nature while at the same time 
maintaining a materialist posture concerning the nature of reality. Humans do 
shape history In ways of their own choosing, but only by consciously and 
unconsciously calling material reality into existence through the continuous 
process of everyday life. 
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2. Region and place 
For the sake of convenience In empirical study the see-touch realm of 
geometric space Is divided into sub-eategorles called "regions", more or less 
identifiable by the prevalence of certain categories of phenomena based on 
the subjectivity of the observer. DeBlij (1971) Identifies "formal" regions on the 
basis of homogeneous culture and "functional" regions which act as hinterlands 
centered on loci of human activity. The marxlan model of urban political 
economy takes this duality a step further. Smith argues that in their formative 
state regions represent the natural differentiation of national space based on 
the uneven distribution of production capital (such as abundances of natural 
resources, surplus labor, and locational advantage). In this instar:lce space and 
society are "fused as a unity" (1984, p. 78). With the development of social 
economies, and in particular the rise of capitalism, the conceptual fusion of 
space and society is broken. In t!"te course of crisis and the devaluation of 
productive capital, Smith sees the development of a "second nature" caused 
by capitalist strategies of technological and locational switching. These regions 
of capitalist space are "place-specific", centered on loci of market activity 
which functionally organize society in support of production capital. 
Entrikin (1991) sees the urban realm of place as an areal context 
distinguishable from region only in terms of scale. For HaNey, this represents 
epistemological advantage in that city life becomes a ·concrete abstraction" 
that reflects 
"how individuals act and struggle to construct and
 
control their lives at the same time as it assembles
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within Its frame real powers of domination over
 
them....Soclal, economic, and political processes have
 
a particular meaning at the urban level of analysis
 
and...such a scale of generalization has real
 
Implications for the way in which Individuals and other
 
economic agents relate dally actions to global
 
processes" (1989. p. 163).
 
But "on the street" It becomes increasingly difficult to think of place simply as 
the abstract valuation and devaluation of productive capital proposed by 
Harvey and Smith. Rather, gemelnschaft persists despite its intended 
destruction by capitalist place entrepreneurs who seek to appropriate rents 
and pursue location advantage. As Tuan optimistically observes. ·what begins 
as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and 
endow It with value" (1977. p. 6). The urban story of cultural differentiation and 
Individual biography which dally battle the tendency towards rationalization 
seems at first glance to privilege Idiographic space over nomothetic space. as 
Indicated by Cooke's observation that: 
"work done at the urban level is more detailed in its
 
focus, tending to be concerned with individual
 
decision-making to a greater extent than is the case
 
with regional theory, much of which... includes only the
 
vaguest abstraction of humanity in the form of profit­

maximizing rational economic man· (1983. p. 132).
 
But at the same time. we are reminded by Stone (1989) that even the most 
comprehensive description Involves methodological prejudgment. Thus 
Urbanism, which focuses on a large number of variables in a geographically 
limited area. involves inqUiry Into both Indigenous narratives and universal laws 
because place occupies an epistemological ·betweenness· of Idiographic and 
nomothetic space. /42/ The use of "place" and "region" by Smith. Harvey. 
Cooke and Tuan - whether as experiential or abstract -- centers on the act of 
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human cognition. It constructs an epistemological framework for the 
convenient arrangement of reality Into knowable patterns and processes. 
Similar thinking Is used by Blier to introduce her study of indigenous 
Batammaliban architecture In Togo and Benin. Blier describes two ways of 
approaching truth, emphasizing the duality of narrative and metaphorical 
expression: 
"one conveys the reality defined In actual experience;
 
the other extracts from this reality, transferring its
 
meaning to other forms and ideas. Each compliments the
 
other In conveying meaning and symbolic intent" (1987,
 
p. 1-2). 
In order to firmly establish Urbanism as nondlsciplinary study, it is Important to 
define its focus in terms of an ontological realism which is more than an 
epistemological end to itself. this reality I call locale. 
3. Locale 
Giddens defined locale as a "place-specific" manifestation of economic, 
political, and social history creat~d by "the use of space to provide the settings 
of interaction, the settings of interaction in turn being essential to specifying its 
contextualitV (1984, p. 118). In other words, locale is derived from a 
socio-spatial dialectic which calls forth material reality through ideological 
action. This is virtually identical to the definition of Dear and Walch (1989), who 
see locales as 
"a complex synthesis of objects, patterns, and 
processes derived from the simultaneous Interaction of 
different levels of social process, operating at 
varying geographical scales and chronological stages 
...as though a multi-tiered sequence of events had been
 
telescoped into a single dimension; many levels and
 
scales of process are simply collapsed on to a single
 
territory" (p. 7).
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On the surface. the meaning of locale appears no different than the 
conventional geographic term location. But like place. location carries dual 
epistemological meanings which also make reference to areal scale (Wheeler 
and Muller. 1981). One meaning Is site. by which I mean the inherent objective 
composition of a parcel of land which determines human activity in terms of its 
carrying capacity. The other Is situation, by which I mean the contextuallty of 
relative location within a delimited region as experienced from one particular 
place In that region. But dual epistemology never satisfactorily answers the 
question ·what is real?· because in the process of looking at one abstraction 
(such as site). we fail to comprehend the other (in this case situation).43 
Through a unified project of idiographic and nomothetic inquiry we can 
attempt to transcend partial theories of Interdisciplinary study and 
simultaneously observe setting and contextuaIity. Inevitably we meet failure 
because of the essential false duality of our project. 
What is Inappropriate to the measurement of three- dimensional space. 
however. may be totally appropriate to the measurement of four-dimensional 
tlmespace. I contend that urban theorists have gropingly advanced towards 
an historical geography. unable to resolve the epistemological dilemma of false 
duality. because they have refused to abandon three-dimensional ontological 
space. This problem Is solved by considering locale in the context of 
timespace. Unlike place. which is an epistemological construction of both/and. 
locale now becomes an ontological construction of both/and. To measure 
and describe timespace requires that we apprehend the partial theories of 
interdisciplinary studies In the context of a nondisciplinary framework. This is 
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what Harvey proposes when he says 
·Any attempt to create an interdisciplinary theory with
 
respect to a phenomenon such as urbanism, has perforce
 
to resort to (operational structuralism) ....the only
 
method capable of uniting disciplines in such a fashion
 
that they can grapple with issues such as urbanization,
 
economic development and the environment. is that
 
founded In a properly constituted version of
 
dialectical materialism as it operates within a
 
structured totality in the sense that Marx conceived of
 
it" (1973, p. 302).
 
I am unprepared to declare the ontological supremacy of marxism because 
the newfound implications of four-dimenslonal timespace may yet deconstruct 
historical materialism beyond recognition. Harvey himself ties his realist 
methodology to philosophy - as does Levi-Strauss - but argues that while 
separation is a matter of convenience ·It is amazing how far convenience can 
lure· (1973, p. 11). I am prepared to assert a four-dimensional ontology which 
facilitates the operational structuralism of a spatio- historical materialism. This 
may well turn out to be a marxist construction. But it requires a return to the 
freshness of phenomenological investigation. Harvey is right to warn that 
·phenomenological approaches can lead us into idealism or back into naive 
positivist empiricism just as easily as they can into a socially aware form of 
materialism· (1973, p. 129). It is my hypothesis that such danger is lessened if we 
understand that emergent phenomena are not superficialities but temporal 
parts of deeply hidden necessary structures. 
To borrow the imagery of Zen, when we look at one pearl of a necklace, 
we can see the reflection of all the other pearls strung together. An exhaustive 
search of partial theories taken out of context will do little to improve our 
understanding of the urban condition. A concentrated focus on the timespace 
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phenomenology of one particular locale will explain much about the general 
case. This is not false induction, because within locale all of the objects, 
patterns, and processes of urbanity are spatially and temporally compressed in 
the holographic memory of a single phenomenon.44 
The Increasing tendency in metatheory to understand representations of 
spatial morphology as a mental topography as well as the naive reality of 
geographic fact is exemplified by Harvey's semiological journey from place to 
locale in a decade of theoretical writing.45 I see this trend -- which attempts to 
interrogate the metanarrative of structuralism with local stories and postmodern 
improvisation - as leading to a realism which addresses areal differentiation in 
the full context of experiential, perceptual, and imaginary space and not 
simply as a spatial fetish of market disequilibrium.46 
The value of self 
In arguing the pragmatic necessity of cartesean duality Derrlda (1972) points 
to Levi-Strauss, who goes beyond Durkheim by asserting an unconscious 
collective (Ritzer, 1988). The Idea of an unconscious collective allows us to 
consider in physical space the objective external projections of mental as well 
as social structure, manifest by the perceptual and imaginary spatiality 
contemplated by Lefebvre and Strohmeier. For Levi-Strauss, the ultimate 
structure Is the structure of the mind: ·the grand objectivicatlon of life into the 
totality of its physiochemical conditions· (1962, p.327). Levi-Strauss rejects as 
anthropological myth the cartesean duality of nature and culture, yet 
incorporates it in his methodology to effect a ·self-criticism" of the human 
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condition. As I have shown, this position slyly argues that what has no value as 
truth may still have value as method. The materially determined human mind Is 
incapable of pure ontological construction and must instead piece things 
together out of bits and pieces (a process which Levi-Strauss calls brico/age). In 
theory Levi-Strauss rejects spatial configurations as fetishism, but in practice he 
willingly employs them as materia/ culture. 
But such pragmatism, which argues that results are the true test of validity, 
leads to an ideological problem because - as I have shown throughout this 
investigation - our experiential reality Is for the most part derived from our 
epistemological prejudice. For marxlan structuralists like Althusser, who Is 
opposed to both Idealism and empiricism, there is no true connectivity (such as 
a knowing subject) between knowledge and object. Althusser recognizes two 
parallel constructions of reality he calls the concrete-in-thought (which is 
knowledge) and the concrete-reality (which is its object). Concrete-reality 
occupies the experiential world of geographic space while concrete-In-thought 
occupies the topological space of the human mind. For Althusser, 
concrete-In-thought is made real by the transformation of ideology Into 
knowledge similar to the way in which raw materials are transformed into chairs 
and tables. The carpenter has his craft, and the theorist has hers. What we 
think of as social constructions are In fact spurious correlations caused by the 
assertion of false ideologies. In other words, human consciousness is a 
contingent response to material conditions and seems to have power only 
because we believe it to be true. For structuralism the ultimate goal of the 
human sciences is the dissolution of self, leading Levi-Strauss to go so far as to 
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call the knowing subject the spoilt brat of philosophy (Sarup, 1989). 
Sounders (1986) points out that the lack of connectivity between the 
theoretical object and the real object in marxian structuralism is the same 
critical weakness found in the ecological paradigm, e.g. Park's assertion of 
human ecology as both a theoretical approach to knowledge and an 
empirically-grounded branch of sociology. At a critical depth, their world 
remains divided between human values and scientific facts because for them 
the materially derived structure of cognition can not account for human 
freedom. In other words they see individuation -- in the tradition of Kant. 
Simme!. and the "young· Marx - as a false ideological proposition which treats 
reality as a social construction of culturally specific activity. But their attack on 
voluntarism leads to an epistemological problem, because without the human 
project of empirical investigation there is no way to validate theory as real. 
Uninformed by epistemic feedback, structuralism is open to the charge that its 
general theory is Ideologically motivated and that its application to the 
particular is as an act of "epistemological imperialism". 
Urban landscapes representative of structuralist paradigms -- such as the 
capitalist space of von Thunen analysis -- alienate humans from primitive 
nature47 through their lack of a participatory basis for planning and design. 
Such practice, typically asserted by the closed pedagogy of traditional schools 
of urban science, has crystallized "the whole field of urban planning".as the 
organization of participation In something in which it is impossible to 
participate" (Bonnet, 1989, po 138). 
By asserting the problematic of pedagogy I hope to underline the 
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significance of metatheory to professional practice and thereby promote 
interest in my closing remarks. As I have already stated, I seek as metatheory 
that which structurally unifies subjective self and objective reality through the 
self-constituting aspect of human nature. In other words, I agree with Lichtman 
that human nature - the structure of capacities, tendencies, and sensibilities 
that human beings bring, albeit premature, to their life world at birth ­
constructs itself both as the subject of Its objectivity and the object of its 
subjectivity: 
"Human nature has no independent existence. It is an
 
aspect of a dialectical totality, which is itself
 
constituted by the interrelation between nature, human
 
nature, technique (such as symbolic interaction). the
 
structure of the social world, and the dimension of
 
historical time - the medium through which human
 
practice continually reorganizes the meaning of the
 
whole" (1990, p. 15).
 
In this sense I hope to continue the early work of Marx's anthropology, in 
which he asserted that "the highest expression of man's 'species-being' came 
not in the consciousness of the infinite...but in objective human activity" (Miller, 
1982, p. 23). Human activity - pre-conditioned by the independent spatial, 
temporal, and causal properties of nature - In turn mediates underlying reality 
by calling forth but never creating the material bits and pieces which emerge 
in the phenomenal see-touch world as structure: 
"Human beings do not alter...structure, but they
 
utilize this structure (as they understand it) to
 
transform its manifest character...employing
 
constructed technique, for purposes determined by the
 
system of social life" (Lichtman, 1990, p. 17).
 
Erdmann and Stover (1991) point to the empirical work of Roger Sperry, 
which showed that human values, beliefs, and goals directly affect our brain 
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states and brain physiology. Such mediation of materialism and idealism is . 
possible not only due to our natural capacity to adapt to reality but our critical 
human capacity to make choices and to transform that reality, to achieve 
self-actuallzation through a transpersonal ecology which Freire (1973) calls 
integration: 
·to the extent that man loses his ability to make choices and is 
subjected to the choices of others, to the extent that his decisions 
are no longer his own because they result from external 
prescriptions, he is no longer integrated· (Freire, 1973, p. 4). 
Towards a metatheory of urbanism 
By privileging metaphor over narrative, the urban question seems deep 
rooted in an epistemological emphasis on what is knowable rather than the 
ontological what is, leading to a mechanistic model of reality "which has seNed 
to legitimate the human prediction, control, and manipulation of nature· 
(Merchant, 1989, p. 199). Granted ·no species can sUNive without gaining 
some crucial control over that portion of the natural world that is critical to its 
sUNival·, but we are also cautioned by Uchtman on the limits of such relativism 
because ·however protean the inventions of humanity and however unfettered 
the creative imagination, these inventions and this imagination cannot void the 
foundation of the natural order upon which their very practice depends· (1990, 
p. 15). 
Despite the contradiction of significant variations in how and to what 
degree societies configure space, the bits and pieces of bricolage unearthed 
through obseNation represent a material reality that can be called forth and 
organized but never created by human activity. Carr (1986) points out that 
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narrative is not just a literary form but a reflexive social process resembling the 
composing and re-composing of a story. In this sense history is not simply an 
epistemological approach to knowledge but an essential temporal part of 
four-dimensional space. I argue against Althusser that concrete-in-thought 
exists as knowledge Inside the human mind to be transformed into 
concrete-reality through the process of Ideology. Rather, I argue with 
transcendental realists that there exists an implicate order of deep material 
reality from which we call forth objects, patterns, and processes through 
ordinary activity in everyday life (Entrikin, 1991).48 The pluralistic constructions of 
space which probabilistlcally emerge from the implicate order require 
numerous theories and methods to understand them, not because they are 
convenient fictions or instruments of bricolage, but because it is improbable 
"that the diversity of phenomena on the macroscopic
 
level can be fully explained in terms of a finite set
 
of unalterable, eternal elements and interactions
 
discovered at a deeper level of investigation (nor)
 
that- -the IQWS and causal principles applicable in any
 
one context of Inquiry can be extrapolated indefinitely
 
to all other levels of phenomena" (Schlagel. 1986, p.
 
275).
 
In his critique of the structuralist position, Sarup points out that "the notion of 
a stable structure really depends on a subject distinct from it. One can see 
that a wholesale attack on the subject was in due course bound to subvert the 
notion of structure as well" (1989, p. 2). In structural linguistics, subject is more 
than simply individuation, it stands for the apprehension of the stable sign.49 
Postmodernists argue that by deconstructing the subject into consciousness 
and selt. i.e. by asserting concrete-in-thought inside the human mind, Althusser 
inadvertently shifted philosophical emphasis from ontology to epistemology, 
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from objective reality to the act of cognition. This is quickly understood In 
considering this passage on architectural theory by Hillier and Hanson: 
·By the assumption that what is to be sought is a
 
relation between the 'social' subject (whether
 
Individual or group) and the 'spatial' object acting as
 
distinct entities, space is desoclalised at the same
 
time as society is despatiallsed. This misrepresents
 
the problem at a very deep level, since it makes
 
unavailable the most fundamental fact of space: that
 
through its ordering of space the man-made physical
 
world is already a social behaviour. It constitutes
 
(not merely represents) a form of order in itself: one
 
which is created for social purposes, whether by design
 
or accumulatively, and through which society is both
 
constrained and recognisable.· (1984, p. 9).
 
What Hillier and Hanson refer to as the ·fundamental fact of space" 
paraphrases what Heller (1990) asserts as the essential properties and 
persistence conditions of four- dimensional timespace. What the idealist claims 
as socially constructed Is in a deeper sense materially determined. But what 
the realist discounts as contingent may in fact be the empirical manifestation of 
an even deeper, determinar:ley. This is best explained by chaos theory (Gleick, 
1987), which emphasizes that order masquerades as randomness and that 
nature is constrained by common underlying themes called "strange attractors·. 
For the importance of chaos in developing an appropriate timespace 
epistemology is twofold. First. a focus on nonorder gives us a way to study how 
people's actions alter the conditions of their existence: 
·social analysis must attend to Improvisation, muddling
 
through, and contingent events· because individual
 
thought and feeling are culturally shaped by ·one's
 
biography, social situation, and historical context"
 
(Rosaldo, 1989, p. 102-103).
 
Second, by the intrusion of external circumstances chaos raises our 
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consciousness level from "I" to "We", compressing tlmespace Into the observable 
phenomenon I have defined as locale. Carr calls for a deep phenomenology 
to capture emergent narrative as experienced by the collective action of the 
we-subject: 
"It is true that face-to-face encounters can be
 
fleeting and meaningless. Obviously a great deal will
 
turn on the character of the common object or objects
 
which play so crucial a role In this scheme. Simply
 
sharing the same space, provided the parties are aware
 
of each other In doing so, does constitute a common
 
experience. But an object or event which becomes the
 
focus of attention for several persons can change their
 
attitude towards each other. The pedestrians on a
 
crowded street hardly consider themselves a group. But
 
a traffic accident, which sUddenly forces them into a
 
group which the members recognize as such....The
 
pedestrians on the street are transformed from (unknown
 
membership In a group) to (we-relationship called
 
community) by the intrusion of external circumstances"
 
(1986, p. 133). 
Borrowing from fractal geometry, we know that the seeming randomness of 
phenomenon in nature is repeated at whatever scale we chose to 
investigate.50 This means that In studying Urbanism our choice of scale is 
primarily a choice of convenience. An understanding of human activity in 
four-dimensional timespace requires we focus our imagination on possible 
worlds which ontologically offers us a complete understanding of economic, 
political, and social history compressed as an essential node of timespace. A 
problem inherent in naive phenomenological study is that it considers social 
meaning as "something which is added to the surface appearance of an 
object, rather than something that structures its very form" (Hillier and Hanson, 
1984, p. 8). This position denies space ontological power as the giver of shape 
and form to our material see-touch world. To move towards a metatheory of 
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Urbanism - which I see as the pedagogical foundation for urban science and 
urban planning - I propose the reassertion of object through the individualistic 
case study of locale. 
The Importance of object Is demonstrated in the recognition that form does 
not follow function, nor does pattern follow process, because the potential 
subjectivity of function and process are inherent in the forms and patterns 
which pre-eondition their use and activity (McHarg, 1971). To do this I first 
accept nature as a system of spatial, temporal, and causal properties 
independent of human activity and attribute to it an ontological status which 
precedes human existence (Uchtman, 1990, p. 17). This is significant because 
"social practices are inherently spatial at every scale and all sites of human 
behavior" which Dear and Wolch (1989) see as determining human 
activity in three aspects: 
1 - social relations are constituted through space, such as when 
opportunities for natural resource exploitation pre-eondition production; 
2 - social relations are constrained by space, such as the "inertia imposed by 
an obsolete built environment"; and 
3 - social relations are mediated by space, such as the development of 
regional culture and patterns of everyday life. 
A philosophical turn to contextual realism requires not only a rethinking of 
the predominant paradigms but an unthinking of the epistemological duality of 
idiographic and nomothetic space. The term ·unthinking" is borrowed from 
Wallerstein (1991), who uses as his starting point the Annales movement which 
began in late nineteenth century France. The movement itself was a reaction 
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against a closed pedagogy which Institutionalized the social sciences in a 
discrete categorization which precluded interdisciplinary study. By the 19205, 
the movement had matured into an attack on 
"the division of all knowledge into two mutually 
exclusive (and mutually denunciatory) epistemologies, 
the Idiographic and the nomothetic. While the 
idiographic particularists (mostly historians and 
ethnographers) argued that the world could only be 
usefully perceived In its complex concreteness, the 
nomothetic universalizers (mostly economists and 
sociologists) argued that the world could only be 
usefully perceived by learning its underlying general 
laws" (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 220) 
The Anno/es movement attempted a reconciliation of metanarrative and 
local stories by analyzing "large space and long time" using the "double 
temporality" of persisting social structures and cyclical events (conjunctures) 
within these structures (Wallerstein, 1991). Pr()ctically, this Interpenetration was 
accomplished by the analysis of economic and social patterns over time as 
well as individualistic patterns of everyday life. But no matter how well 
interdisciplinary studies are orchestrated they still privilege categorization by the 
very acceptance of the validity of disciplinary thinking (Daly and Cobb, 1989). 
For Wallerstein - like Hegel and Marx - the answer is a nondisciplinary theory of 
history which incorporates all other theories: 
"In any era when even physicists have (re)discovered
 
the centrality of the "arrow of time" to the analysis
 
of physical phenomena...it ill behooves social
 
scientists to neglect this reality" (1991, p. 259).
 
How would such unthinking affect my proposed metatheory of Urbanism? 
Wallerstein does not say, but by his indictment of neo-classical economic 
theories, I suggest he would call for a spatial morphology capable of 
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evolutionary change In an historical context. The material base is ontologically 
homogeneous only at the instant of its birth, true for both the Big Bang and the 
undifferentiated isotropic plane of Von Thunen's urban analysis. No system can 
produce anything new unless it contains some source of randomness (Asby, 
1956). By analyzing 'Iarge space and long time' we may find that 
'It may well be that under the eye of eternity. which
 
sees everything In cosmic and eternal context, all
 
event sequences become stochastic. To such an eye...it
 
may be clear that no ultimate preference is necessary
 
for the steering of the solar system. But we live in a
 
limited region of the universe, and each one of us
 
exists in limited time. To us, the divergent is real
 
and is a potential source of either disorder or
 
Innovation' (Bateson, 1979, p. 189-190).
 
Precisely the same critique used to attack the validity of neo-classical 
abstraction must be used to unthlnk the key proposition of all positivist 
paradigms that 'any cross section of the universe will reveal a similar 
ontological grain' (Schlagel, 1986, p. 275). As Frier (1973) reminds us, to think 
dlalectlcally,is' to decree the obsolescence of cherished concepts which 
explain even one's recent past. Once freed from the epistemological 
imperialism of carteseanism, the true nature of space can be seen as an 
Inexhaustible matrix of settings and contextualities and not the "mimetic 
abstraction' of positivist reduction (Entrikin, 1991). 
The call for holonistic thinking which began this project is echoed by 
Japanese architect Klshio Kurokawa, who calls for a philosophy of symbiosis 
which transcends the limitations of dualistic thinking: 
·What we see here are two extremes - an extreme faith
 
in the virtues of technology and. at the same time. an
 
extreme rejection of the value of technology. This
 
dualistic, pendulum phenomenon only confuses and
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unsettles our thlnklng....The time has come for us to
 
transcend dualism and leave these extreme swings of the
 
pendulum behind us. Since human beings are by nature
 
an ambiguous form of existence, incorporating
 
contradictions and oppositions, we have no grounds for
 
disdaining or faulting that which is Intermediate,
 
which cannot be divided Into opposing dualisms. On the
 
contrary, I am convinced that this intermediary zone
 
will prove to be a fertile field of human creativity as
 
we face the future. (1991, p. 42).
 
This "intermediary zone" - which Entrikin calls the betweenness of space ­
represents the philosophical base for a metatheory of Urbanism which allows 
theorists and practitioners to study the urban question employing a full range of 
theories and methods. In doing so I hope to capture the vitality of idealism as 
well as the structural logic of realism. I accept the self-consciousness of man, 
that my mind exists at most as a "mere epiphenomenon of matter". I accept 
that the real world exists independent of my concepts, although it can be 
grasped by them. But I reserve for myself and all humans a role in the 
decision-making process of choosing the reality In which we live, and am none 
the more insulted if my actions are no more than secondary qualities of matter 
like light and color. The reality I observe would not exist apart from my 
presence in it. This sense of participation, in calling forth and organizing matter 
if not constructing it ex nihilio as would the idealists, is called the anthropic 
principle of cosmology (Harrison, 1981). It asserts, as do I, that the universe is 
the way it is because we are here. 
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Endnotes 
(1) Metaphysics Is the study of ultimate reality. By ontology we mean that 
portion of metaphysical InqUiry dealing with the division of reality within our own 
universe; more closely related to the physical world of human experience. 
Epistemology Is concerned with theories of knowledge: what is knowable?, as 
opposed to the ontological what Is? Having established an epistemological 
basis for inquiry, the last step Is to ask the methodological question how do we 
come to know?, and in doing so design an appropriate research agenda. 
(2) In response to philosophical propositions of realism and idealism (see 
footnote 5), Descartres developed the view that the human person is made up 
of two substances, a mind and a body, and with it a more general claim that 
"every single thing which exists Is either a mental thing, that is, a mind, or a 
bodily thing. Carteslanism Is, therefore, a dualist theory, according to which a 
radical and exhaustive division of all that there is can be made into these two 
categories" (Sprigge, 1984, p. 13). 
(3) Harvey corrects this error in The Urban Experience (1989), an abridgement 
which reassembles the most relevant chapters of the two previous works in an 
integrated narrative of the city. It should be pointed out in fairness to Harvey 
that he considers human consciousness to be a response to material conditions 
and not necessarily a causal factor In the production of social space. The 
implication - at least for Harvey - is that the self-consciousness of man is 
determined by the urbanization of capital. In this manner his two-volume work 
can be seen as representative of dialectical logic and not cartesean duality. 
(4) By idiographic I am referring to methods which study individualistic narratives 
of human biography, social situation, and historical context. as opposed to 
nomothetic methods In which the object is to find general laws which subsume 
individual cases. Thrift (1982) also uses the terms 'contextual" and 
"configurational" to describe the chorology of human agency and the terms 
"compositional" and "Immanent" to describe the geography of structure. 
Entrikin (1991) uses the terms "Idiographic" and "nomothetic" to bracket the 
neo-Kantian "search for a middle ground between the general and the 
particular" (p. 94). The neo-Kantlan movement - leading to the sociology of 
Max Weber - attempted to mediate idealism and materialism by denying 
absolute priVilege either to Hegel's man of self-consciousness or Marx's 
self-consciousness of man. This Is a precarious position which requires the 
assertion of idiographic space and nomothetic space as epistemological and 
not ontological concerns. In other words, human inquiry is value-based, 
leading to knowledge which stems from cognitive interests. To see only 
Idiographic space Is to learn more and more about less and less, until at last we 
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know everything about nothing. Ukewise, to see only nomothetic space Is to 
learn less and less about more and more, until at last we know nothing about 
everything. Neo-Kantians see both epistemological positions as "modes of 
abstraction through which finite minds seek to create rational order out of an 
infinite reality" (Entrikin, 1991, p. 97), hence the validity of a scientific 
representation is a function of the validity of the standard of selection. 
(5) Materialism and idealism are opposing doctrines in philosophy. According 
to materialism, matter is the ultimate reality, as opposed to idealism, the 
position that the external material world is either constructed by or dependent 
upon the mind, making reality contingent on the subjectivity of the observer. 
For the most part I have avoided the term "realism" because it is used both in a 
modern epistemological sense and in a classical ontological sense. Where I 
use the term it is in its modern context, in which objects such as a table or chair 
have an existence independent of their being perceived. In this sense, realism 
opposes both ontological idealism and methodological positivism. In its 
extreme form, called naive realism, the things perceived by the senses are . 
believed to be exactly as they appear to be. Ontologically, "realism" refers to 
the Platonic doctrine that abstract concepts have objective existence and are 
more real than concrete objects. In this sense realism is similar to "idealism", 
and the basis for much confusion In philosophical writings. 
(6) The fragmentation of Urban Studies into a collage of postmodern schools 
and styles with no regard for synergistic inquiry Is very much due to the fact that 
"upon most English-speaking thinkers, who are professed fanatical philosophical 
imbeciles... philosophy makes no impression" (Marcus, 1975, p. 331). 
(7) The semantic confusion over the term "space" becomes clearly if we 
associate its meaning with the ecological term "niche". Niche describes 
simultaneously the behavioral functions and physical habitat of a particular 
organism. Space, as used in this paper, is an invisible field of human interaction 
as well as a tangible container of environments and landscapes. To limit the 
confusion, I have not asserted the more subjective meanings of cognitive, 
proxemic, and psychological space, although they are equally as valid. 
(8) At the University of New Orleans the specialty programs involve a more 
interdisciplinary approach: urban history, city and regional planning, or the 
social sciences. 
(9) Leshan and Margenau discuss the concept - known in psychiatry as, 
catastrophic anxiety and in anthropology as marginalization -- whereby 
humans, in their development, build their ego to support, and be supported by, 
that view of reality their culture believes to be the correct one, If and when 
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that model crumbles. we experience a weakening of our ability to function 
(1982). This explains the failure of Levi-Strauss. and in general the failure of all 
culturally Inappropriate methods. 
(10) The neo-Kantians accepted the historicism of Herder. which denied the 
classical notion of an ideal man and an ideal society. Herder instead asserted 
verstehen, the burden of the historian to understand things as they truly were. 
Historicism included three Important concepts: populism (the importance of 
cultural groups); expressionism (the expression of human action); and pluralism 
(the personality of Individuation). 
(11) For example. Durkheim's work on suicide has been criticized for his logic of 
"explanatory generalization". which inferred variations in an unobservable 
"suicidogenic current" based on empirical variations in the suicide rate. See 
Giddens (1971). 
(12) Similar to Durkheim's observation of the suicide rate 'as if" it was the 
underlying phenomenon. Park substituted the see-touch world of community for 
the analytical world of the biotic. "In this way. he tried to fuse a phenomenal 
form with a realist concept" (Saunders. 1986. p. 64). 
(13) Atkinson (1990) argues that the development of a discourse may take 
place along one of two different lines: metaphor is abstract and relies on 
similarity; metonymy is narrative and relies on contiguity. Sayer (1984) points out 
the importance of metaphor as a rhetorical device to 'explain the unfamiliar by 
reference to the familiar" but discounts the mathematical models of logical 
positiVists who claim to use "metaphor" in what are "primarily calculating 
devices" (p. 60). As Daly and Cobb (1989) remind us. 'community is precisely 
the feature of reality that has been most consistently abstracted from in 
modern economics. The need is not for one more theorem squeezed out of 
the premises of methodological Individualism by a more powerful 
mathematical press. but a new premise that restates the critical aspect of 
reality that has been abstracted from -- namely. community" (p. 43). Woodiwiss 
(1990) sees even non-mathematical reductionism as problematic to functional­
structuralism due to "the respect mistakenly accorded the original Marxist figure 
of fetishism" (p. 50). While I argue that human ecology trivializes history through 
reductionlst metaphor. I do not argue against the use of metaphor within the 
context of narrative. For example. Sayer proposes a pedagogical role for 
metaphor In narrative texts. as opposed to an ideological role which delimits 
rather than describes realist structures. 
(14) Economic man (homo economlcus) is a metaphor of the methodological 
individual who obeys perfectly the axioms of neoclassical microeconomic 
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theory. These axioms (after Lea, Tarpy, and Webley, 1987) state that given 
arbitrary bundles of commodities (·shopping carts·) A, B, and C: 
+ Axiom of completeness: the consumer prefers A to B, or prefers B to A, or Is 
indifferent between them. 
+ Axiom of greed: if A contains more of one particular good than B, and at 
least as much as Bof all other goods, A will be preferred to B. 
+ Axiom of transitivity: If A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A 
will be preferred to C. 
+ Axiom of convexity: If B is a mixture made by mixing x% of A with y% of C, 
then neither A nor C will be preferred to B. 
(15) Leshan and Margenau (1982) show how the molecular world (an atom) 
follows different laws than the molar world of ordinary-sized objects (a 
baseball). Ukewise, the positivist methodology used to measure social activity 
operative in personal space Is not necessarily valid to measure realist structures 
which merge into time-space. 
(16) Desai (1991) includes an Interesting quote in which Marx writes Engels 
•...you know the tables which give prices, discount rate, etc. etc. in their 
movement during the year. in ascending and descending zigzags. I have tried 
several times - for the analysis of crises -- to calculate these ups and downs as 
irregular curves and thought...that I could determine the main laws of crises 
mathematically. Moore, as I say, considers the matter impracticable, and I 
have decided to give it up for the time being.... 
(17) I am aware that ·begging the question· is logically a fallacy of petitio 
principii (Barker, 1965). But it is also a rhetorical rephrasing which is merely 
another statement of the same argument. As such, I contend it Is a valid 
methodological approach, albeit suspiciously postmodern. 
(18) Harvey (1989) refers to the ·ever slippery Castells" in reference to his 
repeated flip-flops on such issues as the importance of space and the viability 
of human agency. We speak here only of Castells as an advocate of marxian 
structuralism. 
(19) I use the terms "marxist" and "marxian" to distinguish Marx's classical position 
from the larger literature based on his dialectical framework. A third term 
·neo-marxist" refers more succinctly to attempts to reposition marxism as a 
critique of late capitalism. 
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(20) This duality Is not accidental, according to Marcus (1975), who points out 
the contradiction between social reproduction and capital accumulation in 
terms of Kant's assertion that human agency introduces freedom into the realm 
of events formerly comprehended by mere analytical understanding. To make 
his point clear, Marcus describes his own experience in information systems. 
culminating In his critique of Marvin Minsky as to why computer simulation of 
human intelligence Is impossible. Marcus wrote the 490-page Dialectical 
EconomIcs to provide his students with "a working mastery of Marx's method 
and major economlc- theoretical Ideas for graduate students... in such 
specialized fields as political science, anthropology, and philosophy" (p. 0. 
Perhaps the best one-liner Is his frustrating lament that "upon most 
English-speaking thinkers, who are professed fanatical philosophical 
imbeclles...phllosophy makes no impression" (p. 331). 
(21) Katznelson (1981) borrows his concept of hegemony. which is defined as 
the cultural leadership exercised by the ruling class, from the Italian marxist 
Antonio Gramsci. Whereas Gramscl speaks of hegemony as opposed to 
coercion (which Is exercised by legislative power or expressed through police 
intervention), Katznelson substitutes the terms "social control" and ·coercive 
control". 
(22) Which Is precisely the elitist position of Gramsci, who argued that the 
proletariat would require gentle prodding from the intelligensia to stir them to 
revolutionary fever. 
(23) By the time of the Third Intematlonalln 1919, Lenin succeeded in Imposing 
an unrelenting materialism - attributable to Engels - on marxist theory which 
stagnated dialectical thinking. In Dialectics of Nature Engels had reformulated 
historical materialism "as a sub-dlsclpline within a more inclusive science of 
dialectics, embracing a dialectics of nature as its ultimate justification (at which 
level) his own reflex theory of consciousness implied a devaluation of 
sUbJectivity, and thus a revision of Marx's original thinking, with far-reaching 
implications" (Miller, 1979, p. 112). 
(24) Similar to his assertion that Urbanism is both a form and an epistemological 
construct, Harvey (1974) argues that space Is both absolute and relational. 
Absolute space (after Newton) is a "thing in itself" with an existence 
independent of matter. Thus it can possess a structure in which we can 
"pigeon-hole" or to Individuate phenomena. Relative space is understood as a 
relationship between objects. Relative space exists only because objects exist 
and relate to each other. Harvey proposes (after Leibniz) a third type which is 
relational space, in which sense objects exist only insofar as they contain space 
and ontologically consist of parts which relate to each other. 
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(25) Quantitative marxism attempts to 'avoid the naive functionalism of some 
Marxists who believe that merely pointing to the beneficial consequences of an 
action/event serves to explain It" (Sheppard and Barnes, 1990, p. 11) by 
providing explanations of actual mechanisms of economic behavior through 
rational choice models and game theories developed by neo-classical 
economics. But while quantitative marxlsts start with the rational and utilitarian 
self-interest of homo economlcus the actors In the marxist model rationally 
chose their status as exploiters or exploited, leading not to market equilibrium 
and social harmony but exploitation and class formation. Quantitative marxlsts 
share with neo-Ricardians the rejection of Marx's labor theory of value, which 
Marx took from Ricardo and subsequently applied to the exchange value of 
labor as well as Ricardo's limited application to produced commodities. 
(26) Because an understanding of these terms Is essential to Harvey's thesis, It 
will prove advantageous to briefly define them - along with the labor theory of 
value -- before continuing this rehearsal: 
+ Labor theory of value: For Marx, the economy exists to create useful 
objects with measurable value. Under capitalism, workers do not produce 
things for their own use but for the exchange of other things, called 
commodities. The true value of these commodities is based on the value of 
labor time expended 
In their production. Marx did realize, however, that the actual exchange value 
of commodities in the marketplace depended on numerous factors including 
supply and demand (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988). 
+ Surplus value is the value remaining when the worker's daily subsistence 
costs have been subtracted from the value that he produces. If in two hours a 
worker produces goods of a value equal to his daily wage, then for the 
remaining six hours he will be creating surplus value which is appropriated 
("exploited') by the capitalist (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988). 
+ The overproduction of commodIties, which appears to the naive observer 
as a periodic glut of products, Is usually reflective of a shortage of products 
relative to demand, but under conditions of extreme overpricing which limit 
consumption (Marcus, 1975). Harvey (1982) offers several interpretations of 
marxist theory because Marx himself did not complete his critique of Say's Law, 
which in its simplest form stated that incomes paid to laborers must equal the 
costs of production, hence all commodities produced would be automatically 
consumed. But Marx did call Say's Law 'pitiful claptrap', which would seem to 
put him in agreement with Marcus' interpretation of overproduction. 
+ Failing rates of profit result from the need for credit during periods of 
overproduction to enable capitalist sellers to dispose of surplus value to 
capitalist buyers who use the surplus value to expand the scale of production 
which In turn secures the value of credit crucial to this system. While this in itself 
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seems healthy, the market price is now free to stabilize at the margin of 
overpriced or even fictitious speculative values. Marx defines the rate of profit 
as S/(C+V), or the ratio of surplus value and all constant and variable capital 
costs. When capitalist production is subject to artificially inflated variable costs 
(Le. - overhead costs), the result will be falling rates of profit, unless the surplus 
value is raised by lowering the labor wage or raising the commodity price. This 
dogfight of inflation and recession, creating temporal cycles of boom and bust, 
is problematic to the logic of capital accumulation (Marcus, 1975: Desai, 1991), 
leading to strategies of technological and locational reswitching in the pursuit 
of profits. 
(27) To the positivist response that marxists, by postulating unobservable realist 
structures, do not lay their theories open to test, Harvey (1989) quotes Marx's 
comment that "frequently the only possible answer is a critique of the question 
and the only possible solution Is to negate the question". 
(28) There is, of course, the quantum option that Park and Harvey are both 
right: "One of the fascinating things about alternate realities is that at the time 
you are using one It makes perfect sense to you, and you know it is the only 
correct way to view reality. It Is only common "sense" (Leshan and Margenau, 
1982, p. 11). 
(29) The classic case of instrumentalism is Ptolemy's contrived astronomical 
system which maintained the appearance that the earth was the center of the 
solar system by hypothesizing that the planets orbited an epicenter which itself 
revolved around the earth. This explained the retrograde rotation of the 
planets in the sky which otherwise threatened a paradigmatic crisis. "The Greek 
and medieval astronomers who adhered to Ptolemy's instrumentalist view were 
not at all disturbed by the fact that the same appearances could be saved by 
two or more quite different hypotheses....they were concerned simply with 
finding the simplest and the most complete theory for practical purposes" 
(Wallace, 1989, p. 25). 
(30) Falsificationism as a doctrine is associated with Karl Popper, who ·claims 
that scientific advance can only come about through the testing and falsifying 
of hypotheses, which are then replaced by new hypotheses, also subject to test 
and falsification. One cannot ultimately verify, only falsify· (Abercrombie, Hill 
and Turner, 1984, p. 94). sayer (1984) argues against falsificationism on two 
fronts: it denies natural necessity and allows only a chaotic world of contingent 
events: it is impossible In such an inductive world to build a theory worth 
falsifying because experience outruns Imagination. For Sayer, some 
metanarratives are not inherently deductive and are resistant to falsificationism. 
Bits and pieces of realist theory may give the appearance of being falsified, but 
the revision of these theories by their authors should not be viewed 
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"uncharitably as evasion". At any rate, falslficatlonism cannot be used by 
positivists to attack reflexive thinking anymore than realists need defend 
metatheory from counterlnstances. From either epistemological viewpoint the 
issue is moot. 
(31) Merchant (1989) asserts that the mechanistic construction of nature is 
based on a set of ontological, epistemological, methodological, and ethical 
assumptions about 'reality' which Include: 
+ nature is made up of discrete, atomic particles; 
+ information bits are discrete; 
+ the universe is natural, rational, and predictable; 
+ problems can be broken down, fixed, and reassembled without changing 
their character; 
+ science is context-free, value-free knowledge of the external world. 
(32) Smith (1984) points this out In his observation that by the close of The Limits 
to Capital Harvey himself speaks only of the primary circuit of capital to better 
accommodate the neoclassical model. 
(33) It is unclear if Harvey is referring to Saussure's difference or Derrida's 
differance. Difference refers to the structuralist assertion that there is no 
one-to-one link between signifier and signified. Derrida uses differance to 
combine the meanings of "to differ" and "to defer". Both of these words, as well 
as "otherness", evoke postmodern fragmentation, regional differentiation, and 
non-linear causality: for Harvey a major concession from his earlier position that 
space was trivial and contingent. 
(34) This offers up the possibility of reconciling human ecology and symbolic 
interaction in a neo-Kantian geography that adequately accounts for both the 
idiographic and nomothetic qualities of space. Symbolic Interactionism, 
developed by Talcott Parsons in the 1970s as an alternative to functionalism 
and involves the study of self-society relationships as a process of symbolic 
communication between social actors. My reading of Thrift is that he proposes 
two symbolic interactions: first an implicit dialectic between social actors and 
social structure and second an explicit dialogue between society and nature. 
use the term "dialogue" rather than "dialectic" because the heavy hand of 
geographic fact - what Wolch and Dear (1989) call the "power of geography" 
- seems to deeply determine social relations and social structures while they in 
turn merely inform nature through social constructions such as territory and 
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scarcity which do not really alter material reality. I use the term 'Inform' In its 
cybernetic sense of providing feedback to a parent system, which I will discuss 
further In the course of this paper. 
(35) Sentiment is the inadequately articulated sense that a 
particular place uniquely fulfills a complex set of material and nonmaterial 
needs (Logan and Molotch, 1983). 
(36) I am amused by the number of texts which refer to gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft as 'untranslatable'. Having the opportunity to ask Dr. Gerhard 
Strohmeier of the St. Polten (Austria) Research Center of Educational and 
Regional Development, on the occasion of his 1990 lecture at the University of 
New Orleans, to translate the words into English, he replied -- without blinking 
an eye - 'community and society", 
(37) Thrall (1987) has developed a quantitative representation of consumptive 
need superior to the neo-elassical model which only considered the rational 
growth of production. Thrall establishes as the basis for his model the 
proposition that ·the state of static equilibrium is attained when all households 
with the same income and taste preferences have the same level of welfare' 
(p. 12). In other words, Thrall's mathematical model is demand-oriented, not 
supply-oriented, considering the behavior of consumers in terms of use value as 
well as exchange value. 
(38) This Is essentially the 'development of underdevelopment' which Frank 
(1967) theorized would exist within North American cities between metropolis 
and satellite, similar to the macrocosmlc center-periphery relationships of world 
systems. 
(39) Sheppard and Sames touch on this phenomenon in their exposition of 
Sraffa's theory of fixed capital and its relationship to rentier decisions 
concerning the life-cycle of the built environment of consumption (1990, pp. 
137-159). 
(40) I make this distinction notwithstanding Sayer's argument that "ideas that 
observation which is theory-laden must therefore be theory-determined and 
that theories are observation-neutral can be easily refuted" (1984, p. 68). On 
the one hand, Sayer argues against the cause-and-effect of theoretical 
interrogation and epistemic feedback. On the other hand, he points out that 
"the radical difference between knowledge...and material objects' does not 
rule out the 'possibility of practical adequacy between them' (1984, p. 69). 
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(41) Harvey - after himself developing a similar typology of spatiality -- solved 
his own dilemma by invoking a calculus of hlgher-order contextualizations: 
"The approach (taken in the first part of the book) is
 
that once we have discovered what space is and have
 
discovered ways of representing it, then we can proceed
 
with our analysis of urban phenomena by fitting our
 
understanding of human behaviour into some general
 
conception of space. This approach fades into
 
insignificance in the later essays (of the book) and
 
space becomes whatever we make of it during the process
 
of analysis rather than prior to It. Further, space is
 
neither absolute, relative or relational in itself, but
 
it can become one or all simultaneously depending on
 
the circumstances. The problem of proper
 
conceptualization of space Is resolved through human
 
practice with respect to it. In other words, there are
 
no philosophical answers to philosophical questions
 
what arise over the nature of space - the answers lie
 
in human practice. The question 'what Is space?' is
 
therefore replaced by the question 'how Is it that
 
different human practices create and make use of
 
distinctive conceptualizations of space?" (1974, p.
 
13-14).
 
Yet less than two pages before this strange maneuver Harvey criticizes the 
"artificial separation of methodology from philosophy" and "facts as separate 
from values" as "injurious to analysis even In their apparently harmless form of a 
separation of convenience" (1974, p. 11-12). If we assume Harvey to be a 
realist, we are led to the puzzling paraphrase that "there are no realist answers 
to realist questions that arise over the nature of space". 
(42) The word predates Entrikin (1991) as the cognitive "middle way" of 
Buddhism, with an emphasis on both/and rather than the Cartesean either/or. 
(43) This is a variation of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics: if 
we know an objects speed, we cannot know for certain Its position; if we know 
its position, we cannot know for certain Its speed (Capra, 1984). 
(44) See Bohm (1980) and Talbot (1991) for a complete explanation of 
holographic theory, which includes the concept that each portion of the 
universe - no matter what scale - contains a complete record of the universe 
past. present. and future. I use the term holographic memory metaphorically to 
illustrate the wealth of information compressed in the timespace of locale. 
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(45) I summarize Harvey's semiological journey based on the number of pages 
referenced in the subject index. Whether or not the usage indicates Harvey's 
reflexive theorization, there seems to be a shift in meaning from space 
representative of setting to space representative of contextuality. 
LOCATION PLACE LOCALITY 
HaNey (1982) 41 o o 
HaNey (1985) 17 25 o 
HaNey (1989) o 43 20 
(46) Strohmeier's (1990) construction envisioned mental and substantial 
geographies representing reality and value. The resulting matrix produced four 
discrete types of "space images": imprints (mental/reality), images 
(mental/value), pictures (substantial/reality), and "icon" (substantial/Value). 
(47) Sack (1980) sees primitive space not as underdeveloped space but as the 
primeval space of pre-capitalism when nature and society were united in 
functionality and consciousness. 
(48) Empirical evidence for a hidden order is offered by Ashihara (1989) in his 
study of urban design in Tokyo. 
(49) The sign in semiotics represents the association of the signifier (usually a 
physical object, a word, or a picture) and the signified (a mental concept). 
(SO) Harvey (1974) suggests that an analytic treatment of spatial form might 
possibly develop out of Euclidean geometry. I suspect that chaos theory and 
fractal geometry will yet provide a better basis for such analysis. 
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